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BETWEEN
KOREA AND THE UNITED STATES

by

Chang Geon Oh

June 1990

Thesis Advisor:

Richard A. McGonigal

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However in recent years it is not always the case considering the recent phenomena happening in Korean society. How can it happen that Korean cannot be pro-America given that Korea normally had been dependant on the United States?

So, through this paper, I will analyze the reality of Korean's perception of America by focusing on the historical facts that have affected Korean's perception throughout relationship between U.S. and Korea, and the recent causes of negative perceptions of America.

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Relationship and Perception
between Korea and U.S.

by

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
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
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ABSTRACT

During the last century, Korea and the United States have maintained a cordial and friendly relationship. Normally, Korea is considered to be a pro-American country in international society and that has been true.

However in recent years, it has not always been the case considering the recent phenomena happening in Korean society. How can it happen that Korea cannot be pro-American given that Korea normally had been dependent on the United States ?

In this paper, the reality of the Korean's perception of America is analyzed by focusing on the historical facts that have affected Koreans' perceptions throughout their relationships between the United States and Korea. Also, the recent causes of negative perceptions of America are examined.



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I. INTRODUCTION

With the signing of the Treaty and Commerce in 1882, Korea and the U.S. entered into a new relationship after two bloody events marked the beginning of American-Korean relations over a century ago.

After establishing a relationship, the U.S. has been an outstanding partner to Korea in international society and Korea has been oriented to pro-American country. Often the relationship between the two country has been called bloody-strengthened relationship especially since the Korean war and Vietnam war.

In fact, throughout recent history, U.S. has performed the role of savior in the Korean war, of protector whenever Korea is in crisis, of modernization guider to follow. In a sense, Korea has been to a great deal dependent on the U.S. for the national security, development, trade, etc. Therefore it was natural that Korea was oriented to pro-American nation. So called, honeymoon relationship has been persisted throughout mutual relationship.

However, in recent years, anti-Americanism is on the rise in South Korea even though the number is minor. Why anti-Americanism is rising in South Korea against their traditional

friendly relationship ?

Before the 1980s, the South Korean view of America was filled with illusion, myths, enviousness, thanks, and the celebration of God, hence the sentiment of anti-Americanism could not even think about and could not be heard anywhere in Korean land. The image of the United States as the special nation began in 1945 when Koreans perceived Americans as "liberators" who eliminated the hated Japanese imperialist rule, and when the U.S. shed blood and saved Korea in the Korean war, and when U.S. supported Korea everytime Korea is in need. This kind of relationship and perception made the Korean people to regard the America as a brother country.

This perception probably originated in the traditional Asian view of international relationship. The so-called sadae relationship between Korea and China was governed by an extrapolation from the Confucian family system in which the younger served the older brother and the older felt a duty to protect younger. Because the United States replaced China as the older brother in the traditional relationship, it was natural for Koreans to consider it as a special state, and such a perception has encouraged them to have various expectations of it. In a sense, some part of current anti-Americanism results from frustration against their expectations of it. And then, what is their critical concern? That is Korea reunification, sound democratization, and

national development.

So through this paper, I would like to illuminate the historical facts that affects Koreans' perception of America and the causes of recent negative perceptions for the further mutual understanding.

In Chapter II, and III, I describe the historical relationship between the Korea and the U.S. that influences Koreans' perception of America.

In Chapter IV, I describe the Koreans' general sentiment about America throughout mutual relationship.

In Chapter V, I describe the recent causes of anti-sentiment that Koreans feeling about America.

In conclusion, understanding a people's perception of a country is very important in the process of policy decision, diplomacy, and mutual relationship especially under the circumstances that people's voice have more power than before, like recent South Korea.

II. HISTORICAL RELATIONSHIP

A. THE EARLY RELATIONSHIP

1. The First Meeting

Due to its strict, self-imposed isolation, Korea had remained totally unaware of the existence of a new federal republic on the other side of the Pacific Ocean until the appearance of American ships in Korean costal waters in the mid-nineteenth century.

The earliest documented encounter between the two peoples took place in January 1853, when a strange looking ship came to Yongdangp's, (Pusan area). According to the diary, several Korean officials visited the ship with a Japanese-language interpreter. No communication could be established, however, because written messages in either Chinese characters or the Korean alphabet merely elicited responses from the newcomers in an unintelligent script that the Koreans perceived as cloudlike picture drawings. The officials' report contains a detailed description of the ship, including notes on its size, equipment, living quarters, provisions, and the physical appearance of its crew as well as their clothing and footwear, and even the presence of a young woman and a male child whose hair was as white as sheep's wool. [Ref. 1: p.24]

The Koreans were very curious about their physical appearance. Their prominent noses, brown or blue eyes, porcupinelike hair, tattoos on their bodies, and their variously shaped caps aroused the Korean's curiosity. It was the presence on board of two Japanese that enabled the Koreans to learn that the ship was a whaler driven off course by a storm. The foreigners on board frequently repeated a word that sounded like "myorigye" to the Koreans; this word must have been the name "America". Thus the first recorded meeting of the Korean and American peoples ended in mutual incomprehension.

The second visit by Americans to Korea occurred on 15 July 1855. Four crewmen of an American whaling ship, including two brothers, swam ashore and were cared for and returned home by way of China by the Koreans. It was only when the Americans and their escort of Korean officers reached Peking China that the Koreans first learned that the whales were from the country of the flowery flag [the stars and strips]. Thus the four whalers became the first Americans ever to set foot on Korean soil. Again the incident was handled by Korean officials as a matter of routine humanitarian assistance to foreign sailors in distress. It is unlikely that even this visit by the four Americans to Korea did much to enhance knowledge of the United States among Koreans.

The year 1866 marks a milestone of a sort in Korean-American relations. An American merchant vessel, the General Sherman, forced its way up to the Taedong River, ignoring repeated requests that it turn back, and ran a ground when the rain-swollen river subsided. The ship was burned and all on board were killed by Korean officials, who were enraged by the cavalier use of armed force by the ship's crew. Ostensibly it came to trade, but the Koreans were suspicious that the real objective of the trip was to rob the ancient tombs of their Kings. [Ref. 2:p.25]

In January 1867, Captain Shufeldt was sent from the Asiatic squadron upon the U.S.S. Wachusett to inquire about General Sherman. He was told that the crew was mistaken for pirates and were killed. Commander Febiger on the U.S.S. Shenandoah went to KOREA in May 1867 to make further inquiries but learned nothing more than Shufeldt. That same month, two ships which had on board a German-American named Ernst J. Oppert and F.B. Jenkins, a former American interpreter at the U.S. Consulate in Shanghai China, went to Korea to steal the bones of an ex-king and hold them for ransom. But they failed. This incident strengthened Korea's isolation policy. and further sullied the already grievously tarnished image of all foreigners, including Americans.

In the summer of 1868, the U.S. Secretary of State William H. Seward approached the French, who were also having

problems in Korea with the persecution of their Catholics, for a joint punitive mission. The French refused.

In May 1871, the Commander-in-Chief of the Asiatic Squadron, Admiral John Rogers, sailed to Korea under the orders of Secretary of State Hamilton Fish to open Korea for trade and secure a treaty for protection of shipwrecked sailors. The Rogers expedition of six ships, carrying eighty-five guns and 1230 men, met fierce Korean resistance on the island of Kanghwa, near the mouth of Han river. Their only result was the destruction of five Korean forts and 350 Korean soldiers killed. [Ref. 3:p.13]

Thus the Korean perception of the United States, forming as it did an ill-differentiated part of the overall image of foreigners as barbarous thieves and robbers, was extremely negative when the "Little War with the Heathen" broke out between the United States and Korea in May 1871. No sooner had the Koreans beheld the "flowery" flag of America for the first time they were accused of insulting it, a charge that served only to exacerbate the distrust between the two countries. [Ref. 4:p.26] In a word, The American expeditionary force, while accomplishing nothing positive, led the Korean government to adopt an official anti-Western policy in 1871.

The United States now became an identifiable target of extreme hatred and a source of dread to Koreans. Such epithets

as "pirates, sea-wolf brigands, and bands of dogs and sheep" were invariably used when referring to Americans. In response to a royal query, the prime minister described the U.S. as a very primitive new country that had been created out of a dozen villages by a person called "Hwa-song-don" [Washington]. One of the most garish manifestations of this nationwide xenophobia took the form of stone tablets engraved with the slogan "Occidental barbarians invaded our land. Not to fight them is to sue for peace. To adhere to peace is to sell out the country". These tablets were ordered displayed throughout Korea "as a warning to our descendants for ten thousand years to come". [Ref. 5:p.26]

A critical factor that shaded the Korean perception of the United States was the attempt by the Chinese government to persuade Korea to establish diplomatic and commercial ties with France and the United States for the purpose of deterring a warlike Japan. But the greatest impediment to the opening of Korea to the Western powers lay in the Korean's fear of Roman Catholicism which forbade ancestor worship and called for the destruction of ancestral name tablets. These Catholic tenets were perceived as striking at the very foundation of the Korean polity, which cherished filial piety and other forms of kinship affection as the cardinal human virtues.

The forcible opening of Korea by Japan with the signing of the Treaty of Peace and Friendship on 27 February

1876, intimidated China. So, for fearing of Japanese expansionism, China put more pressure on Korea to establish treaty relations with the United States.

In 1880, Commander Robert W. Shufeldt tried to negotiate a treaty with Korea again, with respect to opening of Korea for trade and establishment of a legation at Seoul, Korea. But he was immediately repelled by the Koreans. So he sought the help of the Japanese, but his request was also denied because Japan did not want U.S. involvement in Korea for the purpose of protecting their own interests. Again he approached the Chinese Viceroy, Li Hung-Chang, who were willing to provide assistance because he felt that the involvement of the U.S., in Korea would offset the growing influence of the Japanese and Russians.

The motives of Li Hung-chang were two-fold. First, he wanted to enlist American assistance in restraining the Japanese and Russian influence on the Korean Peninsula. Second, Li wanted to make clear the control that China had over the Korean Kingdom already. So, with the mediation of the Chinese, the Treaty of Amity and Commerce was established and signed by King Kojong on May 22, 1882, with the following provisions: "Extra-territoriality for the United States' citizens, the leasing of land for a legation and residence and a most favored nation clause". The second clause in Article I was later to become the subject of considerable discussion

between Korea and the United States. It stated, "If other powers deal unjustly or oppressively with either government, the other will exert their good offices, on being informed of the case, to bring about an amicable arrangement, thus showing their friendly feelings." [Ref. 6: p.21]

Tyler Dennet, a leading historian in American-Far Eastern relations, claims the opening of Korea in 1882 was "by far the most important action undertaken by the United States in Asia until the occupation of the Philippines." and it was " the most notable success of the American navy in the peaceful field of diplomacy". [Ref. 7:p.19]

On Korea's part, this Treaty was the beginning of the open door policy toward the Western World even though KOREA did not have any alternatives at that time. The second clause in 1882 Treaty was to be a future bone of contention between the two States when Japan began to deal unjustly with Korea within just a few short years.

2. Treaty of Amity and Commerce

Cordial relations between the United States and Korea were cultivated after the Treaty. The first American Minister to Korea, General Lucius H. Foote, the Naval Attaché, Ensign George C. Foulk, Dr. Horace N. Allen, a Presbyterian medical missionary, and others who arrived in Korea shortly after the signing of the 1882 treaty contributed much to the growth of friendly attitudes on the part of the Korean government toward

the United States. [Ref. 8: p. 11]

So, during this period, the Korean perception of America was certainly more than a mere matter of personal interaction. It was an amalgam of interpersonal empathy and international power dynamics. Despite the official United States policy of noninvolvement in Korean affairs, it was difficult for an American not to take a very sympathetic personal interest in Korea.

Minister Hugh A. Dinsmore made the following observation in his dispatch of 25 June 1887: "It is utterly impossible for a true American to remain with these people and not become to a degree personally interested in their troubles and natural desire for home rule". Koreans could not help but respond to this American sympathy with trust and appreciation. [Ref. 9: p.32]

On September 2, 1883, Koreans first set foot on American land. In fact it was the first visit by Koreans to any Western nation. Min Yong-Ik, the Royal envoy, describes his experience after returning from America: " I was born in the dark, I went out into the light, and now I have returned into the dark again, I can not yet see my way clearly but I hope to soon". [Ref. 10: p.35] Hong Yong-sik, Min's deputy on his mission to the West, asserted that the most essential feature to be copied from the American model was the system of general public education. Yu Kil-Jun, another member of Min's

entourage, was the first Korean to publish a book on the West, and his book left a profound imprint on modern Korean history.

As mentioned above, the early American diplomat kept a good rapport with the Korean court. Dr. Horace Allen served not only as the charge of diplomatic affairs and Minister Plenipotentiary but also as the personal physician to the King and Queen. American missionaries, the first being Horace G. Underwood and Henry G. Appenzeller, arrived in 1885. They accomplished their mission very conscientiously. They constructed and operated schools, churches and hospitals, etc. Their first task was very appealing to the Korean Government and People. Together with their own mission, American business industry prospered rapidly in Korea. Americans constructed the first railroad, trolley, lighting plant, public water supply, telephone, and many office buildings. With the prosperity of American business, the competition between U.S. and Japan was fierce. At last, U.S. decided to remain neutral and a non-interventionist party in the affairs of Korea. So, the U.S. gave the following instructions to Charge diplomatic affairs Foulk in 1885: [Ref. 11: pp.64-65]

Seoul is the center of conflicting and almost hostile intrigues involving the interests of China, Japan, Russian, and England... it is clearly in the interests of the United States to hold aloof from all this and do nothing nor be drawn into anything which looks like taking sides with any of the contestants or entering the lists of intrigue for our own benefit.

3. Russio - Japanese War

Even after establishing a Treaty between U.S. and Korea, the American government showed only casual interests in Korea at best, and neither the U.S. government, nor the American people knew much, or cared to know about Korea, her culture, history, and people.

Thus, Korea received little political assistance from the United States. The U.S. maintained its strict neutrality in the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895, and in 1899 when the Korean emperor asked the American minister Allen to solicit his government's aid to establish Korea's political neutrality to protect her independence. When the Russio-Japanese War came in 1904 over Korea, the United States, not only refused to help Korea, but actually approved the Japanese actions in Korea.

As early as 1900, President Theodore Roosevelt favored Japanese control over Korea. He wrote to a German friend of his, Speck von Sternburg, that he would "like to see Japan have Korea," because Japan deserved it in order to check Russia. [Ref. 12: p.14]

In February 1904, the Russio - Japanese War broke out, and when the Japanese carried out their military occupation of Korea, neither Great Britain, nor the United States lodged any protest against such a gross violation of international law.

The Japanese, who were the overall victors, asked the

U.S. to mediate, So a Treaty known as "Treaty of Portsmouth" was concluded. Under Article I, gave a Russian acknowledgement that Japan possessed in Korea, paramount political, military and economic interests, and engaged not to obstruct such measures as Japan might seem necessary to take. This Treaty officially announced international sanction of Japan's right in Korea.

On 29 July 1905, Taft-katsura agreement was signed between U.S. and Japan. This agreement gave American recognition of Japan's hegemony over Korea in return for a promise from Japan not to interfere in the American-held Philippine Islands. But to the Koreans, this became known as the first great betrayal because this agreement could be a seed of misery in Korea history. Because Korea had a bitter experience under the occupation of Japan for 36 years and also this was developed as a cause of divided Korea at least Korean's point of view. Following this understanding, Japan annexed Korea in 1910 without any formal protest from the United States. Kyung, cho chung states in his Korea Tomorrow: [Ref. 13: p.171]

... the U.S. raised no objection to Japan's interests in Korea, in return for Japan's promise to stay out of the Philippines. All of the Western powers in the Pacific were hopeful that Japan would provide a permanent block against Russian expansion toward the Pacific, in addition they expected Japan to be so occupied with her northward expansion that a southward advance would be impossible.

As Korea encountered critical problems in the midst of

the Russo-Japanese War, the United States showed no intention of becoming Korea guardians based on a Treaty (1882). Secretary of State John Hay to the Korean envoy in 1905, said that "Our interests in Korea were rather more commercial than political" when the Korean envoy sought American aid to protect Korea's sovereign rights and independence.[Ref. 14:p.15] But from the point of U.S., the acceptance of Japanese hegemony over Korea was part of the price that U.S. had to pay for Japanese acceptance of the open door-policy, World peace and U.S. interests in East Asia.

Under the severe oppression of Japan's control, Korea's Independence movement happened continuously but most of the activities were carried out without violence. The most important demonstration, which was put down cruelly by the Japanese, occurred on 1 March 1919. This date is still observed as a national holiday in Korea. This Independence movement was partly motivated by U.S. President Wilson's address to the Congress on January 9, 1918. To the Korean people, the call for self-determination and the principle of justice to all people and nationalists, and their right to live on equal terms of liberty and safety with one another, whether they be strong or weak was the needed encouragement to announce Independence against the Japanese.

4. Cairo and Yalta Agreement

Though Korea disappeared from the World atlas, many Korean patriots strived for the Korean independence, but they only received expressions of sympathy.

The question concerning the future of Korea was addressed for the first time by President Roosevelt. He suggested that "Korea might be placed under an international trusteeship, with China, the U.S. and one or two other countries participating." On hearing the news, Syngman Rhee, Chairman of the Korean commission in the U.S., sent a letter to President Roosevelt in May 1943. Rhee urged him "to rectify the wrong and injustice done to the Korean people and their nation during the last 38 years," blaming the U.S. for allowing Japan "to occupy Korea in 1905 and annex Korea in 1910, all in violation of the American-Korean treaty of 1882".

[Ref. 15: p.37]

On December 1, 1943, Representatives of the U.S., Great Britain, and China issued a Joint statement in Cairo concerning Korea future in Cairo. They declared, " Mindful of enslavement of the Korean people, the aforementioned Great powers are determined that Korea shall, in due course, be free and independent". [Ref. 15: p.10] This statement constituted an epoch-making event marking a dramatic turning point in U.S.- Korean relations. The U.S. made a formal commitment to Korea independence before the whole World.

At Yalta, it was agreed as a modus vivendi, not a part of the official agreement, that Korea should be placed under an international trusteeship. This is evident from the following conversation between Roosevelt and Stalin:

[Ref. 17: p.16]

He said he had in mind a trusteeship composed of a Soviet, an American and a Chinese representative. He said the only true experience the U.S. had in this matter was in the Philippines, where it had taken about fifty years for the people to be prepared for self-government. He held that in the case of Korea, the period might be from twenty to thirty years. Marshall Stalin said the shorter the period the better, and he inquired whether any foreign troops would be stationed in Korea. The president replied in the negative, to which Stalin expressed approval. The president said there was no question in regard to Korea which was delicate. He personally did not feel it was necessary to invite the British to participate in the trusteeship of Korea, but he held that they might resent this. Marshall Stalin replied that they would most certainly be offended. In fact, he said, the Prime Minister might kill us.

The question is why Roosevelt and Stalin did not conclude a formal agreement on Korea. What is known is the fact that this was an unusual agreement with no parallel. In retrospect, had Roosevelt been more keenly aware of the historical nature of the Korean question, and had he reached a concrete, formal agreement at Yalta with a view to stifling Soviet's ambition for Korea, the United States might have avoided the artificial division of Korea six months later.

B. AFTER WORLD WAR II

1. Moscow Agreement and Divided Korea

On July 26, 1945, U.S., United Kingdom, and China reaffirmed their Cairo statement on Korea in the Potsdam Declaration. On August 8, 1945, upon its entry into the war against Japan, the Soviet Union declared its participation to the Potsdam declaration. The Russian ambition for a division of Korea has a deep historical background. In 1903, the Russian Minister, Rosen, proposed to Japan that the portion of Korea north of the 39th parallel be designed as a neutral zone to secure Russian interests in Manchuria. But because of loss in War with Japan, they could not materialize the ambition. The Soviet Union once again revealed its interests. Their troops entered Korean territory on August 9, 1945 and by August 15 had overrun all of Korea north of the 38th parallel. Due to the Russian entry into the War against Japan on August 9, 1945 and Japan's first offer of surrender on August 10, 1945, U.S. planning had to be abruptly switched from an invasion strategy to that of occupying the enemy territory and accepting Japan's surrender. Contrary to the widespread misconception that the division of Korea was another secret agreement made either at Yalta or Portsdam, the division of Korea for accepting Japan's Surrender was later confirmed in General MacArthur's General Order #1 of September 2, 1945. This order stated that Japanese forces north of 38th parallel

in Korea would surrender to Soviet troops, while those south of the 38th parallel would surrender to U.S. troops. But at that time, the occupation of Korea by the Soviet and the U.S. was regarded as the third betrayal of the Korean people. The Koreans were deeply aggrieved by this cruel manipulation of their national integrity by the two occupying powers, the United States and the Soviet Union. Although Koreans realized soon enough that the decision was not made with malice or forethought, at least on the part of the United States, they could find no better word than "brutal" to describe the externally imposed decision to cut the two along an arbitrarily established line. But the decision by the U.S., of temporary dividing Korea into two zones was based on both military and political considerations to accept the surrender of the Japanese forces and to deter the Soviet Union from taking advantage of political and military vacuum in Korea.

On December 27, 1945, the council of Foreign Ministers of the U.S., the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union concluded the Moscow Agreement. At this meeting the vague term "in due course" used in Cairo Declaration, came to mean "a four power trusteeship for a period of up to five years".

[Ref. 18: p. 67]

From the Korean's point of view, the Moscow Agreement on Korea was regarded as an insult to themselves and as another form of subjugation from which they had just emerged.

Because the trusteeship would mean a postponement of Korean independence and one master (Japan) would be simply replaced by four new masters (U.S., U.K., CHINA, U.S.S.R.). As a result, the whole nation staged demonstrations against trusteeship and in favor of immediate independence.

On January 2, 1946, the communist group in Korea suddenly changed their attitude and came out in favor of trusteeship. Overall, North Korea supported a trusteeship and South Korea opposed this. This was the first crack in the frozen ice into which the whole nation was to be crowded with political chaos.

The Joint Commission established by the Moscow Agreement to take steps for the formation of a provisional democratic government in Korea held its first meeting on March 20, 1946. But almost immediately was at odds with the Soviets. The commission itself could not solve the problem.

Certainly, the Koreans viewed the United States in August 1945 as their friend and liberator, and regenerator of their hopes and aspirations. However, Koreans were destined to drink bitter cups once again. Their friend and liberator came as conqueror, their liberated land became partitioned and occupied by foreign troops, and the southern half of Korea was put under an alien military rule again. Korea narrowly escaped the five year trusteeship of the Allied Powers, but they witnessed the growth of Cold War in Korea and the emergence of

two states in their land, each claiming the legitimacy and jurisdiction over the entire peninsula.

2. The Birth of KOREA

Judging that negotiation must be held at a higher level if any progress was to be achieved, the U.S., proposed calling a foreign ministers' conference of itself, Britain, China and the Soviet Union for the settlement of the Korean problem. When Russia officially refused to accept this proposal, the U.S., placed the Korean questions before the United Nations on September 17, 1947. Unilateral action like this to refer the Korean question to the U.N. General Assembly was tantamount to an admission by the United States of failure in and was a violation by the U.S. of an international agreement regarding Korea. But this course of action seemed inevitable and the most promising alternatives under the circumstances. As one analyst put it "it would place on the United Nations and its members some of the responsibility which the United States had hitherto assumed alone. At the same time, since American security was not considered to be at stake, no vital interests would be jeopardized." [Ref. 19: p.29]

On September 23, the General Assembly voted to place the question on its agenda and referred it to the political and security committee. A few days later, the Soviet delegation on the Joint commission suggested that Soviet and

United States troops in Korea be withdrawn simultaneously "during the beginning of 1948" and that the Koreans be allowed to organize their own government without outside assistance. The U.S. delegation contended that such a proposal was outside the commission's sphere of authority. The Soviet Foreign Minister communicated the same suggestions to Secretary of State Marshall on October 9. The U.S. called the proposal to the attention of the General Assembly. In addition, Acting Secretary of State Robert A. Lovett informed the Soviet Foreign Minister that the question of troop withdrawal from Korea must be considered as an integral part of the solution of the problem of establishing an independent government for a Unified Korea.

The General Assembly discussed the Korean question at its plenary meetings. During the debate the Soviet Representative, Andrei A. Gromyko, maintained that the Korean question did not fall within the purview of the United Nations. Nevertheless, the General Assembly on November 14, 1947, adopted two resolutions, proposed by the United States, providing for a program for Korean independence.

The U.N. temporary commission on Korea (UNTCOK), which was established by the General Assembly's action of November 14, 1947, held its first meeting at Seoul on January 12, 1948. Part of their mission was to set up an elected National Assembly according to the proportions of the population from

the two zones, whose members would then be authorized to establish a national government.

The UNTCOK arrived in Korea on January 8, 1948 and tried to implement the U.N. resolutions, but Soviet-occupied North Korea denied the effort. So, the commission decided to consult the Interim Committee of the General Assembly to determine whether it was appropriate for the Commission to implement the Assembly's program in South Korea. The conclusion of the Interim Committee was embodied in a resolution which stated that the program set forth in the Assembly's resolution of November 14, 1947, should be carried out. Under this resolution UNTCOK proceeded with an election in South Korea only.

The election was held and observed by UNTCOK, the result was a victory for the elements under Syngman Rhee. On August 24, Syngman Rhee signed an interim military agreement with the U.S. Commander providing for the transfer of jurisdiction over the security forces to the new government. The U.S. recognized this new Korean government along with Nationalist China on August 12. Following the issuance of a statement on August 12, Washington named John J. Muccio as its first ambassador to the Korea, and with the inauguration of the Korea on August 15, 1948, the American military rule was terminated.

An American spokesman stated in 1948 that the

inauguration of the Korean Republic was not a final step in the execution of American commitments to establish a free and independent Korea, but would have to be followed by economic assistance of a character which would enable the Republic to become a "solvent trading partner in the world economy and to withstand communist ideological penetration from within as well as attack from without." But, in reality the United States had no Korean policy other than the prevention of a collapse of the Korean economy. [Ref. 20: p.19]

C. THE KOREAN WAR

1. Withdrawal of U.S. Forces

Shortly after the elections of March 10, 1948, in the Korea, and one month before the Soviet announcement of September 18 concerning withdrawal of Soviet troops, the U.S. seemed to withdraw completely its political and military commitments from Korea as the Joint Chief Staff had resolved that "under no circumstances would the U.S. engage in the military defense of the Korean peninsula". [Ref. 21: p.19]

Gen. Albert G. Wedemayer, in his report on China - Korea to President Truman, warned: [Ref. 22: p.803]

The withdrawal of American military forces from Korea would, in turn result in the occupation of South Korea either by Soviet troops, or as seems not likely, by the Korean units trained under Soviet auspices in North

Korea. The end result would be the creation of a Soviet satellite communist regime in all of Korea.

Francis B. Stevens, assistant chief of the Division of Europe Affairs, raised the question of whether the United States could get out of Korea without losing its prestige. The United States had the fear that continued lack of progress toward the Korean question would create a chaotic political and economic situation, including violent disorder, making the position of U.S. occupation forces untenable. "A precipitous withdrawal of U.S. forces under such circumstances would lower the military prestige of the United States, quite possibly to the extent of adversely affecting cooperation in other areas more vital to the security of the United States." Furthermore, the United States was convinced that the Soviet proposal for simultaneous withdrawal of occupation forces at the beginning of 1948, "would lead to the early establishment of a dictatorship in Korea." Precisely for this reasons, the U.S. objected to the Soviet proposal for withdrawal, made at the Joint U.S.- Soviet Commission in September 1947.

[Ref. 23: p.883]

The Government of Korea thought that such withdrawal was inadvisable before its own security forces had adequate preparation for defense. Consequently, on November 20, 1948, the National Assembly of the ROK passed a resolution to request that the U.S. postpone its troop withdrawal until the

security forces of the public were capable of maintaining order. Leaving Korea to its own fate prior to reaching an agreement on Korea in the United Nations would be tantamount to U.S., abandonment of Korea. Thus, the decision of withdrawal was postponed until 1948 when the U.N. General Assembly adopted the U.S. draft resolution calling for mutual withdrawal of occupation forces as early as possible.

In April 1949, the U.S. believed that the capability of the Korean defense forces warranted the withdrawal of U.S. troops in a matter of months. So, the first contingent of American troops left Korea in May. But soon after the initial withdrawal of U.S. forces, the situation in the new Republic deteriorated due to armed insurrections and daily surging domestic turmoil. Under these circumstances, the State Department argued that "the complete withdrawal of U.S. forces from Korea at this time would seriously jeopardize the security and stability of the Government of Korea." [Ref. 24: p.1338]

However, the State Department recognized that the continued retention of U.S. forces entailed the risk of being forced to choose between military involvement and precipitate withdrawal in the event of War in Korea, so recommended that the withdrawal decision be reconsidered. But the Department of Army, favoring early withdrawal, presented the following views: [Ref. 25: pp.1342-1343]

- (1) The U.S. has little strategic interests in maintaining its troops and bases.
- (2) The Army made no budgetary provisions for the retention of troops beyond Fiscal Year 1949.
- (3) The ability of ROK forces to cope with internal disorders minimizes the need for future retention of U.S. forces.
- (4) The mission assigned U.S. forces prohibits involvement in actions precipitated by any fraction or any other power which could be considered a casus belli for the U.S.

The disagreement on the timing of total withdrawal between the Department of State and Army was finally solved when President Truman approved the March 22, 1949 report calling for the completion of withdrawal of the remaining U.S. forces no later than June 30, 1949. So, despite strong objections of the Korean Government, the U.S. withdrew its troops from Korea by 29 June, 1949, leaving behind poorly indoctrinated, trained, and supplied soldiers of the newly created Korean Army and a small U.S. Military Advisory Group only to return one year later. Thus, for the first time in a half-a-century, the Koreans were left alone by big powers, in spite of the fact that the country was divided into two hostile forces along the 38th parallel.

2. U.S. Intervention

Despite the declaration of U.S. support for the ROK, statesman and actions of U.S. in early 1950 gave the impression to the international community that the U.S. would not stand altogether behind the Government of South of Korea. The major facts that illustrate this weakening of U.S. supports are U.S. troop withdrawal and Secretary Acheson's(infamous) speech. He told a Congressional Committee that the " American line of defense in the Far East extends from Alaska through the Aleutian chain, Japan, and Okinawa to the Philippines," [Ref. 26:p.19] and made no mention of Korea. In his remarks of January 12, 1950 in a speech before the National Press Club, he reiterated that the United States defense perimeter runs along the Aleutians to Japan, and from Japan to the Philippines, and again he made no reference to Korea. This completely excluded Korea from the defensive perimeter of the U.S. In addition, when he mentioned Korea, he reinforced the notion that Korea was outside this perimeter of military action by noting that we had ended our military occupation of that country. His remarks clearly implied that the ROK was placed outside the U.S. defense perimeter. What was new in his remarks was that "so far as the military security of other areas in the Pacific is concerned, it must be clear that no person can guarantee these areas against military attack." [Ref. 27: p.70]

Probably for these remarks, North Korea seems to have been encouraged to embark upon its military invasion against the South, convincing itself that there would be no military involvement by the United States in case of a full-scale invasion. The North Korea apparently had taken his remarks at face value. What was miscalculated by the North Korean leadership was a new U.S. military and diplomatic approach toward Korea.

Contrary to the general belief that Acheson was going to abandon Korea, Secretary Acheson later emphasized :

[Ref. 28: P.116]

We have given that nation (Korea) great help in getting itself established. We are asking Congress to continue this help until it is firmly established, and that legislation is now pending before Congress. The idea that we should scrap all of that, that we should stop halfway through the achievement of the establishment of this country, seems to me to be the most utter defeatism and utter madness in our interests in Asia.

John Foster Dulles made a more precise statement before the ROK National Assembly on June 19, 1950. In it, he said: [Ref. 29: p.35]

Already the United States has twice intervened with armed might in defense of freedom when it was hard pressed by unprovoked military aggression. We were not bound by any treaty to do this. We did so because the American people are faithful to the cause of human freedom, and loyal to those everywhere who honorably support it. ... You are not alone, You will never be alone, as long as you continue to play worthily your part in the great design of human freedom.

This assurance by Dulles came too late for the North

Koreans to change their plan for military action. Anyway, North Koreans launched an unprovoked attack on all fronts of the 38th parallel on Sunday morning, 25 June 1950, in an effort to reunify Korea under communist domination, equipped with Soviet arms and trained by the Chinese, North Koreans stormed the South, crushing the unprepared South Korean Army and gaining an important initial strategic advantage in the War.

In retrospect, the invasion by North Korea might have been prevented if Acheson had made it clear that Korea had the deterrent value of defending in East Asia. In another respect, if the U.S. had dropped Korea in the face of aggression, the worldwide political, economic and military impact would have been enormous. Japan, which the United States values most in Asia in political, economic and strategic terms, could have been forced to swing into the Soviet camp for fear of aggression which, alone, it could not resist. In Europe, the North Atlantic Treaty organization would not have been given a powerful impetus to its military build-up and its political solidarity. Among other things, the U.S. could have lost its worldwide credibility, weakening the confidence of those who count on the United States.

3. Armistice

The relaxing of tensions culminated, on July 23, 1951, almost one year after the fighting had originated, with Jacob

Malik, the Soviet representative to the U.N. Security Council, hinting the negotiations on the Korean Armistice could be started. In response, U.S. General Ridgway issued an invitation to the Communists on June 30, suggesting that cease-fire talks be initiated. It is significant that this invitation was extended in spite of President Lee's vehement opposition to any negotiation prior to unification of Korea.

Syngman Lee and the people of South Korea were adamant to any arrangement short of the unification of Korea. As early as May 26, 1951, the Lee government had announced that it would continue fighting alone if any truce did not provide for the unification of Korea. Thenceforth, President Lee mobilized the people in support of the cause and denounced the truce at the 38th parallel as "another Munich appeasement".

[Ref. 30: p.588]

On December 2, 1952, President Eisenhower visited Korea and promised military and economic assistance to South Korea if President Lee would agree to accept an armistice to end the fighting. But Lee would not accept any end to the fighting which left Korea a divided nation, and threatened to remove all ROK forces from the U.N. Command.

On July 30, 1951, the South Korean government put five conditions for a cease-fire: (1) the complete withdrawal of the Chinese Communists from Korea; (2) the complete disarmament of the North Korean Communists; (3) a U.N.

guarantee to prevent any third power from giving assistance to North Korea; (4) the full participation of ROK representatives in any international conference or meeting discussing the Korean problem; (5) no arrangement undermining the administrative sovereignty and territorial integrity of Korea. To soothe South Korean opposition, the American government instructed that a senior ROK officer be nominated as a UNC representative. So, Major General Paik Sun Yup and Major General Kang Mun Bong were selected as the ROK representative.

At that time, Senator Alexander Smith of New Jersey asked whether the South Korean commander in the field would have a voice in deciding the matter of a cease-fire. Dean Rusk, Assistant Secretary of State, replied:[Ref.31: p.589]

General Ridgway's representative will be accompanied by a senior Korean officer, who will not be a full plenipotentiary, along with General Ridgway's representative. If the issues were not so important we might concede him the status of full equal, but we feel that our national interests are so great here that we might have Ridgway's representative as the No. 1 man representing the U.N. side, and the other man would be there as his assistant, and would be allowed to say something if he wanted to, but there would be no question as to his status. He would be assisting General Ridgway's representative.

It was the decision of the American government that the United Nations and the United States would ignore the opposition and the participation of the South Koreans in the negotiating process, except letting them say something.

A U.S.-ROK mutual defense treaty first and an armistice next was the basic aim of President Lee. On June 2,

1953, Lee sent a letter to President Eisenhower, offering a public pledge to accept the armistice on the condition that a mutual security pact first be concluded, one that would be provide for continuing U.S. military aid and immediate military intervention in case of renewed aggression and a possible crusade to unify Korea.

Eventually, Lee accepted the inevitability of a UNC armistice under strong pressure from General Clark and President Eisenhower, but he nevertheless attempted to fight on alone. At any rate, the devastating War in Korea was brought to an end, thanks to a high price paid by the U.S., and other nations which repelled the aggression, with the signing of the Korean Armistice on July 27, 1953. But Syngman Rhee, ROK President, was strongly opposed to an armistice which left Korea divided, denouncing the prospective ceasefire as a "death sentence" to the ROK. He reluctantly agreed to a ceasefire only after the U.S. promised him the following:

[Ref.32: p.359]

- (1) Promise of a mutual security pact.
- (2) Assurance of long-term economic aid, with an initial installment of \$200 million.
- (3) Agreement to implement the planned expansion of the ROK Army to 20 divisions with modest increases in the navy and air force.
- (4) Withdrawal from the political conference after 90 days.

Following the signing of the Armistice Agreement, the 16 nations participating in the U.N. Command in Korea met in Washington and issued a declaration which supported the

conclusion of an armistice and expressed their determination to carry out its terms "fully and faithfully." They declared that they would resist any renewal of aggression by the communists, warned that renewed hostilities probably could not be confined "within the frontiers of Korea," and pledged to support future U.N. efforts to bring about an equitable settlement in Korea.[Ref.33: p.28] Also after the armistice, a joint statement was issued by the United States and Korea in which they pledged continued cooperation and agreed that in the political conference of the signatories of the Armistice which was to follow within three months, according to the terms in the Korean armistice, they would seek to achieve the peaceful unification of historic Korea as a free and independent nation. They added that if it appeared, after ninety days, that attempts to achieve mutual objectives were fruitless, both countries would make a concurrent withdrawal from the conference and then would consult further regarding the attainment of a unified, free and independent Korea.

President Lee met Secretary Dulles five times in August to discuss the political conference, economic and military aid, and the mutual defense treaty. President Lee's dependence on the treaty for the defense of South Korea was almost total. He wanted the treaty for South Korea's protection not only against the Communists but also against

the Japanese. Therefore, his objective was to make the treaty as strong and immediate as possible in its implementation. On the other hand, Secretary Dulles did not wish to relinquish his government's freedom of action in executing its foreign policy. The Secretary solemnly advised the President of the importance of having a treaty to which the U.S. senate could give overwhelming consent. Difference derived from the fact that Dulles was talking based on the concerns and needs of a great power, while Lee was negotiating as a leader of a weak, small nation with nothing left but a seeming ability to expedite or disrupt the armistice.

President Lee strove very hard to make the treaty as strong and immediate as possible with automatic implementation and indefinite duration. However, the secretary's intransigence on making the treaty viable and acceptable to the United States prevailed over the president's insistence on a NATO-type pact. In the end, Lee judged that it was mandatory for him to settle soon for some type of treaty with the U.S., for the security of South Korea.

At last the Mutual Defense Treaty was signed at Washington on October 1, 1953. Under Article III of the treaty, each nation recognized that "an armed attack in the Pacific area on either of the parties in territories now under their respective administrative control, or hereafter recognized by one of the parties as lawfully brought under the

administrative control of the other, would be dangerous to its own peace and safety" and declared that "it would act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional processes". During the discussion of the treaty in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, concern was expressed over the possibility that this article might commit the U.S. to give aid if the ROK tried to expand its control over North Korea by military or other unlawful means. The Committee therefore recommended, and the Senate approved, a statement declaring that it was the understanding of the United States that the obligations of this article applied only in event of external armed attack and that the treaty should not be construed as requiring American assistance "except in the event of armed attack against territory which has been recognized by the U.S., as lawfully brought under the administrative control of the R.O.K." [Ref.34: p.30]

By this act, the United States assumed unilateral responsibility for the security of South Korea, an obligation which it had been more than reluctant to accept ever since its temporary occupation began in the aftermath of the Pacific War of 1941-1945.

In retrospect, contrary to the spirit and letters of the joint statement of August 7, 1953, the U.S. failed to consult further regarding the attainment of a unified, free and independent Korea. Be that as it may, the uneasy truce in

Korea was maintained for half a century, although unending border clashes and bloody events have occurred across the 150-mile truce line. On the other hand, the Mutual Defense Treaty between the Republic of Korea and the United States opened a new era in relations between the two countries. The U.S. had tried to avoid sole responsibility for the defense of South Korea since its temporary occupation of half of Korea, designed to facilitate the Japanese surrender after the Pacific War. Because of its reluctance, the U.S. internationalized the Korean issue. Even after the Korean war, it wanted to be only one of many nations to issue a declaration of greater sanctions against any resumption of Communist adventure in Korea. The South Korean government under Lee, on the other hand, badly wanted some form of unilateral U.S. commitment to the security of South Korea. In a sense, Lee succeeded by using "suicidal strategy" in handling the U.S. unilateral responsibility for the safety of Korea. The relationship still remains a hostage of the strategic balance on the Korean peninsula. Thus, the understanding reached at the end of the war and based on the Korean version of "a substitute for victory"--the mutual defense treaty--has proved very significant.

Regarding American responsibilities toward Korea, a long-term Korean specialist Professor Robert T. Oliver said that "The security of South Korea is a moral obligation for

the United States because it was our President Franklin D. Roosevelt who, in early 1945, decided to invite Russia into the Korean peninsula... Furthermore, it was only upon Roosevelt's insistence that the projected restoration of Korean independence to follow Japan's defeat was postponed and subjected to an awkward and unworkable plan to place Korea under a four-power trusteeship... What eventuated was the 38th parallel division of Korea, which led to the Korean War and which poses continuing danger to the peace of the world."

[Ref. 35: p.22]

III. RELATIONS SINCE THE KOREAN CONFLICT

A. ROK PRESIDENT LEE'S PERIOD (1953 - 1960)

Despite last ditch efforts on the part of President Lee to wreck negotiations, the Korean Armistice was signed on July 27, 1953. A few days later a mutual defense treaty between the United States and Korea was signed. The treaty promised that "the parties will consult together whenever, in the opinion of either, their political independence or security is threatened." It also stated in Article II that the parties will "maintain and develop appropriate means to deter armed attack." But, the treaty made it clear that each party would act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional processes(Article III). But when the Senate passed the U.S.-Korean mutual defense treaty in 1954, it attached an understanding clause in which it required "the advice and consent of the Senate of the United States to implement Article II and III." This clause also made it clear that the obligation under Article III applied only in the event of an external armed attack.[Ref.36: pp.270-273]

In short, under the terms of the mutual defense treaty, the United States has no obligation to help South Korea when South Korea itself initiates hostilities. Obviously, the U.S. attempted to eliminate any implication that the unification of

Korea through military action could be undertaken with the assistance of U.S. armed forces.

According to Article 60 of the Armistice Agreement, within three months after the signing of the armistice a political conference was to be held which would settle the problem of withdrawal of all foreign forces from Korea, as well as the problem of Korean unification. However, the opening of the conference appeared no more imminent than it had prior to the armistice.

After signing of the armistice in July 1953, the South Korean government attempted to discourage U.S. efforts to reach an agreement with the communists for the convening of a political conference, which eventually met, however, in the spring of 1954 in Geneva. South Korea initially refused to participate in the conference because it did not see the usefulness of negotiating with the communists to begin with, and particularly because of the inclusion of the Soviet Union. Once again, the U.S. had to bargain to get South Korea cooperation. It promised to help strengthen the ROK army greatly, and to see that the U.S. delegates in the conference would stand firm on the unification of Korea under a democratic government. If the United States had failed to lead South Korea to the Geneva conference, it would have been blamed by the world for the conference's failure. Hence it agreed to South Korea's new demands, increasing U.S.

responsibility for Korea's security.

The few months before the armistice and the period before the collapse of the Geneva conference marks the peaks of Syngman Ree's power in affecting U.S. foreign policy. Ree's power was negative in nature. It existed most effectively in times of crisis. His threats were most probably a means to wage his constant struggle to prevent the world from forgetting South Korean problems. As the immediate crisis passed, such power would no longer play a major role in South Korea's relations with the United States.

Ree also had great misgivings about what he considered a "relaxation of tensions" policy that marked the Eisenhower presidency. He told the U.S. public: [Ref. 37: p.206]

While we dream, hope and plan for peace, the Communists talk and talk, distracting us from what they are doing behind the Iron Curtain. And what have they been doing? They have been building up the largest army in the world, the largest air force, the largest fleet of submarines, and have developed their atomic and hydrogen bombs... If we continue to sit still and ignore the enemy's act because we want to believe his words, there probably will not be any war -- or if there is, it will be a short one. But we will not like the outcome. To win real peace in the world, we'll have to fight for it.

Even during the 1950s, Ree's strong cold-war rhetoric did not sit well with the U.S. public, who regarded his remarks as inflammatory and designed to involve the United States in a dangerous confrontation with the Soviet Union for South Korean self-interest.

President Ree was much more successful in warding off what

might be considered U.S. interference in Korea's domestic affairs. Although the United States viewed the deterioration of democratic politics under Ree with dismay, it showed constraint in dealing with the Ree government on these issues. During the Korean War, the United States was most interested in an early restoration of political stability in Korea and seems to have feared that, if pushed too hard, the president might provoke incidents that would jeopardize the objective of putting an early end to the war. Even after the war, Ree was considered to be the best hope for stability and order in Korea. Even if the U.S. government had wished to bring about a change in the Korean political scene, interference would only have resulted in turning President Ree further against the United States.

It was not until April, 1954, that an agreement was reached to meet in Geneva with U.S. participation in this new conference to be dominated by the reality that as long as Korea remained divided, the possibility of another war existed. In other words, the United States saw the Geneva Conference as the best opportunity to unify Korea by peaceful means, which in turn would eliminate any possibility of forced American involvement in another war.

Delegations from the United Nations command, including The ROK, met with delegations from the Soviet Union, Communist China, and North Korea. Problems arose immediately over

whether or not elections should be conducted by secret ballot under the supervision of the U.N. The North Korea, with the support of China and Soviet Union, refused to accept U.N. supervision on the grounds that the United Nations was a belligerent party in the Korean War and had lost the moral authority and competence to deal with Korean unification. Instead, its delegates proposed acceptance of the Communist Chinese position of elections supervision by a commission composed of neutral nations. What was at stake was not merely Korean unification but the authority and competence of the United Nations.

For two months conference members haggled over what constituted correct solutions to the Korean question. Agreement could not be reached on several issues: (1) Supervision of an all-Korean election, (2) Withdrawal of foreign troops, (3) Extent of U.N. Authority, and (4) Allowance of a veto over the unification process. Unable to resolve these vital issues, the conference adjourned on June 15, 1954, without solving the question of unification which is of the most concern to Koreans.

After the war, the United Nations became the last real hope for Korean unification. Yet, U.S. manipulation of the U.N. during the war for its own purposes had set a precedent which would continue to prevent realization of this hope. The United States first sought approval for its actions in Korea,

and then solicited acceptance of a number of resolutions which, in reality, represented an abuse rather than proper utilization of the United Nations. In all likelihood, the U.S. could have done as well militarily in Korea without reliance upon the U.N. because with the exception of small British, Australian, and Turkish contingents, actions in Korea were conducted by U.S. military forces mainly. Thus, to the Soviet and Chinese, the U.N. was only a facade which provided the U.S. with an international shield for its own policy objectives. Meanwhile, in August of 1953, after the Armistice had been signed, the Soviets called for admission of the Chinese and North Korea into discussions concerning the Korean question. The Soviet Union had no intention of seeing North Korea fall from the sphere of its influence, while the United States had equally no intention of losing South Korea as a buffer against Chinese and Soviet expansion. The unification of Korea had by now become overwhelmed by political and military realities of the cold war.

Hereafter, all efforts of the U.S. toward Korea concentrated on preventing the Armistice Agreement from forcing another war and on the restoration of the war-wrecked Korean economy. As a result, during this period of 1953-1958, the U.S. government provided South Korea with more than 1.3 billion dollars in economic aid, and it was during this period of heavy financial outlay that the U.S. ignored an April, 1956

Communist Chinese note, sent via the British, which requested a conference to consider the withdrawal of all foreign troops from Korea. [Ref. 38: p.78]

On the whole, Syngman Ree, despite his U.S-centered foreign policy, proved to be a tough bargainer as far as the United States was concerned. He persistently and loudly argued for a tough stand against the communists, for a stronger U.S. security commitment and more economic aid for Korea, and against the establishment of too-close ties between the United States and Japan. As a result of his uncompromising and hawkish attitude, Ree probably compromised much of his diplomatic effectiveness.

During the Kennedy administration there were no basic changes in U.S. policy toward the reunification of Korea via United Nations machinery. Even though the U.S. has regularly presented the issue of Korean reunification in the United Nations, the American policy toward Korea in the 1960's was geared toward creating a South Korean government capable of withstanding Communist subversion.

The short-run goal of Kennedy's policy initially seems to have been to maintain strong, pro-American government on the frontiers of Communism and also one of the ultimate objectives was to establish a viable and democratic government in South

Korea, one which could bargain from a position of equal strength with North Korea should unification become a reality. However, American policy was not primarily directed toward the immediate reunification of Korea.

B. PRESIDENT PARK'S PERIOD (1961 - 1979)

1. THE MILITARY REVOLUTION

The Chang Myon interregnum that followed the rule of Sungman Lee was the democratic period in South Korea's political history. Newspapers proliferated, politicians scrambled for position, and political demonstrators marched daily through the streets of Seoul. Under such circumstances, the adoption and execution of effective policies were impossible. Industrial production declined, unemployment increased and prices rose rapidly. Dissatisfaction mounted, especially within the armed forces, until the military brought down the Chang Myon government by a military coup in May 1961, after only nine months in office.

After a military revolutionary group announced it had seized power from the Premier, the United States Embassy in Seoul issued a statement on Tuesday, May 16, expressing strong support for the "freely elected and constitutionally established Government" of Premier Chang. [Ref. 39:p.100] A military rule was distinctly repugnant to Americans and the new Kennedy Administration. During the military coup, the

United Nations Command was seriously weakened in prestige when the military junta supporting General Park utilized unilaterally some Korean armed forces units, technically under U.N. Command, in support of the take-over action.

But there was a tendency in some Administration circles to criticize the action of the United States Embassy in Seoul and the U.S. military commander in Korea for having issued statements on May 16 in support of Chang Government and critical of military officers who seized power. The main question appeared to be not what they had said so much as why they had issued statements without clearing them first with Washington. [Ref. 40: p.101]

The revolutionary committee announced a six-item statement, in which it emphasized anti-communism and the promotion of friendly relations with the United States. Officials in Washington were hopeful on May 18 that political authority in South Korea would be returned quickly to civilian hands, because the U.S. worried about that the intrusion of military men into civilian affairs would become an established pattern in South Korea. The tradition of separation of the military from politics had been cultivated assiduously in South Korea by every United States military commander there since the establishment of the Korea in 1948.

Prolonged efforts of persuasion and pressure were directed at General Park to restore civilian government to

hold elections. At first, the Chairman responded that "such pressure from the American government for a transfer of power would greatly increase military leaders against the United States." Ambassador Berger countered by warning that "any anti-American movement or action would not be treated lightly by American authorities." [Ref.41:p.104]

The Kennedy Administration threatened Park to terminate not only economic aid but also military aid. Chairman Park, embroiled in an internal power struggle among the members of the military revolutionary regime and pressure from the United States, was forced to change his stand on the return of the government to civilian rule several times.

By mid-July, 1961, American attitudes toward the military junta began to change; the U.S. decided to accept the coup and to work with the new military government. This change may have been due to the realization on the part of U.S., that continued negative reaction to the issue of viability of the military junta would inevitably translate into increased confusion, and possibly bloodshed, in South Korea. If the economic and political environment deteriorated to too great an extent, there was an imminent danger of another North Korean attack. Under these circumstances, a joint statement was issued on July 7, 1961 by a representative of the military junta and Secretary of State Dean Rusk, wherein friendship and cooperation were reaffirmed. Subsequently, in a statement on

July 28, Rusk stated that the U.S. welcomed "the vigorous and prompt step that the military government has taken in its efforts to root out corruption and to provide a firmer base for democracy. [Ref. 42 : pp.93-121]

At any rate, the American pressure resulted in the holding of presidential elections on October 15, 1963 which Park won by a narrow margin over former President Yoon Po Sun. The United States then encouraged President Park to follow the example of his predecessor Yoon in constructing a democratically representative government.

On the other hand, concerning the role which the United States played in Korea after 1945, particularly in 1961 at the time when a military coup had taken place in South Korea, Professor Wagner remarked that "The United States has not taken an intelligent approach to the basic problem of seeking an understanding of the land and its people. Seldom has such a massive presence of one nation in another been accomplished by such massive ignorance". [Ref. 43: p. 21] In his opinion, a policy of drift and shirking the responsibilities of the United States, in addition to the lack of knowledge and understanding of the land and the people on the part of Americans, were the major factors which contributed to American failure in Korea.

2. ROK participation in the Vietnam War

The two main diplomatic developments for South Korea during the 1960s were, first, the diplomatic normalization between South Korea and Japan in 1965 and, second, the dispatch of South Korean combat troops to Vietnam in the second half of the decade.

Diplomatic normalization with Japan sought the Korean government as a means of expanding Korea's foreign relations beyond the relationship with the United States and of bringing pragmatic realism into Korea's foreign policy.

In this undertaking, the U.S. itself was instrumental. In the hope that friendship and cooperation between South Korea and Japan would lessen the U.S. defense burden in East Asia, the United States encouraged normalization talks for the two governments. Even though the normalization contributed to reduce the dependence of South Korea on U.S., South Korea continued to remain totally dependent on the United States for its security.

As American military involvement in Vietnam expanded President Johnson decided to request the sending of Korean troops to Vietnam. A message to that effect was sent to President Park on July 25, 1965. Park responded on July 29 that Korea was willing to send troops and that the National Assembly, again without the participation of opposition legislators, approved the move on August 13, 1965.

The normalization of relations with Japan and the dispatch of Korean troops to Vietnam, moves welcomed and encouraged by the U.S., helped to improve the relations between the countries. Korea was the only country to send combat troops to Vietnam besides the United States. The South Korean dispatch of combat troops to Vietnam can be understood as a product of its alliance relationship with the United States. Korea sent troops to Vietnam not as an ally of South Vietnam, but as an ally of the United States. It is known that South Korea had a strong interests in preventing a communist victory and U.S. defeat in Indochina.

Commenting on the motives for Korea's dispatch of combat forces to South Vietnam, Chyun Sang-jin, former ROK vice Minister of Foreign Affairs, wrote:

[Ref. 44:p.54]

The ROK's voluntary dispatch of its armed forces to Vietnam to help the Vietnamese people uphold their independence and sovereignty was prompted by bitter experience during the Korean War and lessons it learned from international cooperation. The resolute action was also based on its own apprehension of situation and on the call of conscience. This is not at all an offensive involvement for war but a defensive involvement for peace. The action was firmly based on the belief that peace can in no circumstances be achieved through appeasement only, but that a proper exercise of strength is inevitable to preserve peace.

The foremost reason for South Korea's decision to send troops to Vietnam was to be found in its desire to prevent the weakening of the U.S. security commitment in Korea. U.S.

military assistance to Korea had been getting progressively smaller, down to \$124 million in FY 1964 (1963-1964), an all-time low since 1956. The average amount of annual U.S. military aid, which had been \$232 million during the FY 1956-1961 period, dropped to \$154 million the FY 1962-1965 period. Advanced military equipment that had been promised to the armed forces was not forthcoming on schedule.

[Ref.45: p.209]

Most significantly, there were reports of U.S. plans for a possible transfer to Vietnam of one or more divisions of Korea-based U.S. troops in the event that additional troops from U.S. allies were not available for combat. For this reason, a promise from the United States that it would not reduce its troop levels in Korea was the major concession sought by the Korean government during negotiations leading to the dispatch of the first Korean combat troops to Vietnam. This decision was to have a major impact on U.S.-South Korean relations because it gave South Korea a greater degree of self-confidence in relations with the United States and an expanded role in Asia's international politics. Until 1965, South Korea had been essentially an isolated, passive international entity depending almost exclusively on the United States for international recognition and diplomatic activities. The situation began to change markedly after the arrival of the first South Korean combat troops in Vietnam.

Once it became actively involved in Vietnam, South Korea began to press on the United States its views about how the Vietnam conflict should be resolved. Fearing possible U.S. appeasement, Korean government urged the United States to strive for a military victory and reject any peace that signified appeasement.

South Korea's increasing assertiveness toward the United States was most clearly shown in its refusal to send more troops to Vietnam despite repeated and urgent requests, initially made by President Johnson during his visit in November 1966 and repeated through Vietnam's Premier Nguyen Kao Ky in January 1967. One indication of Seoul's increased bargaining power with the United States was its extraordinary success in obtaining large sums of military aid during the years following the dispatch of combat troops to Vietnam. Total U.S. military aid to Korea had been \$815 million between FY 1961 and FY 1965, but in 1971 South Korea reluctantly accepted the U.S. plan to reduce its troop level in Korea from 63,000 to 43,000 only after securing a promise from Washington that it would support a five-year program to modernize the Korean armed forces at an estimated cost of \$1.5 billion. [Ref. 46: p.211]

South Korea entered the Vietnam conflict with the primary purpose of preventing the withdrawal or weakening of the U.S. security commitment in Korea. Also, there was a deep

sense of moral obligation in Korean conscience because of the aid given by the United States to Korea during the Korean conflict. This is evidenced by the fact that in September 1964 when the National Assembly unanimously voted for a dispatch of a group of self-defense instructors and a medical team.

There was also growing criticism among opposition political forces in the National Assembly on the decision of overextending military commitment. The controversy over military commitment reached its peak in early 1966 when the ROK cabinet decided to send additional combat troops. The opposition forces argued that the pulling out of 49,000 troops would jeopardize the security of Korea and that such a move might include a similar counter-action by North Korea on behalf of Hanoi, thus increasing the chance of renewed North-South conflict in Korea.

In making this decision which would affect the security of Korea, the ROK government was most probably motivated by the following factors. Firstly, the government was motivated to forestall the redeployment to Vietnam of the remaining U.S. combat troops. A second factor was to further strengthen a ROK security position by obtaining a guarantee for the U.S. automatic and immediate response in case of aggression. A third inducement was to modernize the ROK armed forces through U.S. military and economic assistance programs. A major negative effect of South Korea's involvement in the

Vietnam was the escalation of tensions along the DMZ. The armed provocations of North Korea on land and sea in and near the DMZ and the infiltration into the ROK of armed agents were further intensified with each passing day in parallel with an increase of ROK troops in Vietnam.

Through its Vietnam experience, South Korea became aware of U.S. weaknesses and limitations to its power. Doubt about U.S. military credibility also increased with the North Korean seizure of U.S. intelligence ship 'Pueblo' in January 1968 and a U.S. response that the South Korean government considered inadequate. The U.S. failure to act forcefully in the Pueblo affairs, as well as its refusal to permit the South Korean army to strike back in retaliation for the North Korean assassination attempt on President Park in January 1968, raised questions about the U.S. determination to repel aggression in Korea if it ever became necessary.

3. NIXON AND FORD DOCTRINE

When President Nixon took office in 1969, he was aware of growing congressional and popular dissatisfaction in the U.S., with containment in general, and with the role of the United States as "world policeman" in particular. The result was the famous "Guam Doctrine," later known as the "Nixon Doctrine," which signaled the beginning of a process that was to significantly affect America's military posture in Asia.

Nixon announced a new policy toward Asia pledging that

the U.S. would not automatically be involved in a new war in Asia. The foundation of this policy was a balance of power. This policy balanced a psuedo-alliance system among the U.S., Japan, and China against an equally psuedo-alliance system composed of the U.S., Japan, and the Soviet Union, allowing that U.S. the ability to play one off the other and to enjoy a dominant position without risk of war and without a large military presence in East Asia. Nixon's later decision for Sino-American detente comes from this balancing scheme.

Confronting the Nixon Doctrine, South Korean leaders began to lose confidence in the American commitment to South Korea. As Professor Edwin O. Reischauer rightly pointed out, "Unfortunately, the doctrine has been made to sound like a concept applying to an Asia that is alien to the United States that it is not worthy of defense at the cost of American lives". "Asian boys should fight Asian wars" and presumably the Koreans should not count on American defense commitments. To implement this doctrine in 1970, the Nixon Administration began negotiating in Seoul for the withdrawal of a large part of the American forces within two or three years. [Ref. 47: p.84]

To assuage any doubts the South Koreans might have harbored at the time, the American commitment to help South Korea defend themselves from external attack was reiterated in early 1969 by Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird. Testifying

before the Senate Armed Service Committee, Mr. Laird stated:

[Ref. 48: p.100]

Regardless of the form of our assistance, its basic objectives have remained the same: to insure that our countries either individually or collectively, have the necessary military capability to deter aggression and, failing this, to withstand an armed attack until supporting forces arrive.

By the end of 1971, the U.S., had withdrawn one of the two American divisions remaining in Korea, although the move met with the vehement protest of the South Korean government. In an attempt to compensate the Koreans, the Administration sought an appropriation of a billion dollars, spread over five years to modernize the South Korean army. One implication of a give-and-take policy of this type is that the U.S., may have been planning to buy its way out rather than simply to leave Korea. The modernization program apparently was aimed at assuring South Korea a defense capability against the North, but not an offensive capability.

As a last ditch effort to restrict U.S. forces withdrawal, South Korean leaders urged that the U.S. relocate its Okinawa bases in South Korea, should Okinawa revert to Japan, and at the same time threatened to withdraw all Korean forces from South Vietnam. The Nixon administration, however, seemed determined to withdraw American troops from Asia and to follow a policy of disengagement, thus negating all Korean attempts to assure the long-term presence of U.S. troops on

South Korea.

These events were followed by a series of shocking international changes in the Asian scene. That is the admission of Communist China into the U.N. expelling Taiwan, Kissinger's secret trip to China, and Nixon's own trip to China, all announced without consultation with Korea and Japan. Also we find a new economic polemic developing between the U.S. and Japan, the result being that Japanese exports into the U.S. were curtailed. This limitation was equally applied to South Korean exports into the United States. These events intensified a long-standing fear entertained by Korean leaders that the U.S., and Japan might arrange a reapproachment with China and Russia without their knowledge, leaving Korea isolated from the rest of Asia. [Ref. 49: p.85]

After the decision to reduce U.S. troops in Korea from 63,000 to 43,000, the U.S. shifted a wing of 54 phantom F-4 fighter bombers from Japan to station them permanently in South Korea, and proposed special budget request of \$1.5 billion over a five-year period for Korean force modernization. This move is a clear reflection of the altered concept of a U.S. defence posture in Korea embodied in the Nixon Doctrine. The scenarios of this concept are: (1) with the reinforcement of U.S. Air Force and expanded military assistance programs, ROK forces can provide their own ground

troops to counter a North Korean invasion which does not involve any outside forces and (2) in a future Asian conflict, if it does not involve China, there is a possibility that the U.S. may intervene with the use of tactical nuclear weapons.

A major effect of this new U.S. defense posture was seen in a five-year modernization program for the ROK armed forces. An important part of this program was the transfer of excess material to the ROK government. By June 1972, the United States transferred approximately \$95 million of equipment from withdrawing U.S. troops and excess defence articles.

The principal difference between the Nixon Doctrine and the Ford Pacific Doctrine was in President Ford's pledge of continued America's active concern for Asia and presence in the Asian Pacific region. Far from retreating in disgrace after defeat in Indochina, President Ford affirmed a U.S. obligation to take a leading part in lessening tensions, preventing hostilities and preserving peace. This affirmation reflects a firm U.S. determination to stay in Asia in its quest for an Asian peace and stability.

The primary goal of the Ford Doctrine was to prevent

the outbreak of a second Vietnam war in a region where the U.S. has fought three costly wars since 1941. President Ford believed that this could be achieved by buttressing U.S. allies in Asia on one hand, while cooperating with China on the other.

C. KOREA AND THE CARTER ADMINISTRATION

1. THE KOREA GATE

During the 1970s South Korea's primary concern was over the possibility of a significant reduction in the U.S. military presence in Asia, particularly as a result of U.S. setbacks in Vietnam. South Korea tried to cope with the problem in three ways: by persuading U.S. policy makers to maintain their military presence in Korea with pleas, publicity campaigns, and reasoned arguments; by strengthening its own military capabilities through self reliance as well as through U.S. assistance; and by trying to bring about a stabilization of the Korean situation through diplomatic means by initiating contacts and dialogues with the North Korea, the Soviet Union, and China.

The South Korean government vehemently opposed American troop withdrawal plans. It argued that a serious military imbalance between North and South existed and that

a premature withdrawal of U.S. troops would tempt North Korea to try a military venture against the South. It warned further that the two Koreas would become involved in an expensive and dangerous arms race that might lead to the development of nuclear capabilities. Withdrawal also would increase Japanese doubts about the credibility of U.S. security commitments to Asia, and Japan would then pursue either rapid rearmament or accommodation with the Soviet Union. The Koreans also argued that the Soviet Union's active military buildup in the far east increased South Korea's strategic value to the United States, not only for the defense of Japan, but also for U.S. security.

To make a forceful and effective representation of its views concerning the U.S. security role in Asia, the South Korea tried to reach the U.S. public and Congress directly. The result was a stepped-up effort to foster opinions and attitudes more favorable to the Republic of Korea. But a byproduct of the subsequent efforts was the so-called Koreagate scandal. It created far more problems for Korean-U.S. relations. The lobbying scandal, which dominated news headlines in both the United States and South Korea for nearly two years (1977-1979), significantly undermined the South

Korean government's ability to conduct effective diplomacy. During that period, two parallel investigations, one by the U.S. Justice Department and other by the House Committee on standards and official Conduct (the Ethics Committee) were conducted in connection with allegations that, during the first half of the 1970s, South Korean agents had spent several million dollars to buy influence among U.S. congressman and other officials [Ref. 50: p.214]

On the other hand, South Korea was irritated by the ways in which the investigation of the alleged South Korean lobbying activities in the U.S. was handled by the U.S. government and press. As the U.S. was displeased by apparent Korean audacity in attempting to influence the decision-making process in the United States, so was South Korea disappointed by the insensitivity of the United States in allowing its Junior alliance partner to be accused of wrong-doing by the mass media, legislature, and its own Justice Department. A similar sentiment seemed to prevail within the South Korea over the ways in which the human-rights issue was being handled by the United States.

When the Washington post and NewYork Times reported that the U.S. had first learned of the influence lobbying

through electronic eavesdropping of President Park's Blue House, the Korean government and people were in great anger.

On 22 June, 1978 U.S. Congress finally got tough with Seoul in a tangible manner. To show its displeasure over Seoul's refusal to provide Kim Dong Jo for testimony, \$56 million in food aid was cut off. This action resulted in Kim resigning as President Park's International Affairs Advisor, but it also extinguished the last flicker of hope that he or the South Korean government would cooperate any further with the investigation.[Ref. 51: p.233]

The so called "Korea gate" scandal ended essentially in August 1979 when the U.S. Justice Department dropped all charge of lobbying against Park Tong Sun. In fact, it was precisely during this period that President Jimmy Carter's troop withdrawal plans became the object of persistent attack from influential members of the Congress and military leaders. President Carter's plan to withdraw all 33,000 U.S. ground troops from Korea within a four-to-five year period was announced at a press conference held on 9 March 1977, less than two months after his inauguration.

On the other hand, President Nixon's visit to China in the spring of 1972 was responsible for the opening of the

North-South Korean dialogue in July of that year. South Korean participation in the talks was aimed at exploring the possibility of ending the extreme hostility that had prevailed in the peninsula for twenty-five years. But deadlock was inevitable because each side feared that the other's proposal would weaken its own ideological, military, and international positions.

Another significant development with regard to Korean-U.S. relations in the 1960s and 1970s was the diversification of Korea's foreign economic relations. The U.S. share in Korea's total trade dropped from 49 percent in 1962 to 27 percent in 1976. By 1967, Japan had surpassed the United States as South Korea's primary trading partner, a position which Japan has maintained ever since. The combined share of the United States and Japan in Korea's total trade also has been decreasing, from a high of 76 percent in 1962 to 67 percent in 1976. As of 1976, the United States was still the largest creditor country, with 35 percent of South Korea's total loans, but most of the loans in recent years have been coming from sources other than those in either the United States or Japan. [Ref. 52: p.217]

The Korean-U.S. relationship in the second half of the

1970s exhibited strains and agonies of transition from what might be called a primarily patron-client relationship to some kind of a partnership, even though the asymmetry between the partners in perceptions, power, and influence remained. It is not surprising that an alliance that had been born and functioned on the basis of extreme inequality between the partners would experience a serious strain when modifications in that unequal relationship became necessary.

The United States, while remaining to disengage its ground troops from Asia and to minimize the possibility of getting involved in another Asian land war, still wished to maintain its managerial powers concerning not only the military situation in the area but also the internal arrangements of its alliance partner. On the other hand, South Korea showed continued heavy reliance on the United States not only for its national defense but also in diplomatic and political support, while at the same time resenting lingering U.S. paternalism and interference. Furthermore, in its dealing with the United States, South Korea showed a remarkable inability to understand the intricate workings of the American political and policymaking process, often because it projected its own internal dynamics on the U.S. scene.

Henry Kissenger's reflections on the "troubled partnership" of the Atlantic Alliance in the mid-1960s seem quite appropriate to the Korean-U.S. relationship:

[Ref. 53: p.218]

Throughout much of the postwar period, the policy of our...Allies has consisted essentially in influencing American decision rather than developing conceptions of their own. This, in turn, produced querulousness and insecurity. At times, our Allies have seemed more eager to extract American reassurance than to encourage a consistent United States policy. Excessive suspicion has been coupled with formal pliancy... This has led to a negativism characterized by a greater awareness of risks than of opportunities and a general fear of any departure from the status quo.

The 1970s were a period not only of transition in U.S.-ROK relations but also of learning for South Korea. Gradually, more emphasis was given to persuading the United States with reasoned arguments transmitted through official channels than with emotional pleas or unorthodox methods, as before.

2. The withdrawal proposal

The 1976 United States Presidential campaign must have caused deep apprehension in Seoul. By the time Carter had taken office in January, 1977 all the major factors in the Korean peninsula were watching with great interest, and some with concern, as to how American policy would be changed.

The first major change in policy was the withdrawal announcement. Basically, President Carter had justified his

withdrawal decision on two premises. First, he felt Korea would be sufficiently developed economically to defend itself, and Secondly, he considered the political climate in Northeast Asia stable enough to facilitate the pullout.

Although the withdrawal decision did not come as a complete surprise, the ROK government was disconcerted by the poor timing of the announcement. Also, there was a concern that the U.S. troop-withdrawal decision would be constructed as an American rebuke of the ROK government. South Korea was also displeased because the United States had not sought assurance from the communists side to stabilize the Korean situation before taking unilateral action on troop withdrawal.

In April 1978, in a direct challenge to President Carter, the House Armed Service Committee voted overwhelmingly to prevent a premature withdrawal of U.S. ground forces from Korea. In response to strong congressional pressure, President Carter decided to postpone the withdrawal decision indefinitely after an initial pullout in 1978 of some 3,500 troops.

By spring of 1978 President Carter was slowing down the withdrawal phasing. His excuse was that Congress had to approve his \$800 million in equipment and \$250 million in FMS

credits promised to South Korea. The stiff opposition from Congressional critics in the U.S. as well as from South Korea and Japan, was also beginning to take its toll.

[Ref. 54: p.219]

President Carter during a state visit to Korea in 1979, noted the existence of strong bonds of friendship and cooperation and assured President Park that the U.S. would continue to support the efforts of ROK government to maintain peace and stability and sustain economic and social development. The two Presidents also noted the importance of all nations of respect for internationally recognized human rights. President Carter expressed the hope that the process of political growth in the ROK would continue commensurate with economic and social growth of the Korean nation.

[Ref. 55: p.109]

In February, 1979 the President announced a temporary suspension of the plan, followed by a formal announcement in July that he would maintain the current strength level until at least 1981. The official reason given was increased North Korean personnel and tank strength provided showed in an updated intelligence estimate. The reaction by both South Korea and Japan to the withdrawal suspension was positive.

3. HUMAN RIGHTS

Though the Koreagate issue had terminated, Mr. Carter's interjection of "human rights" considerations into U.S. foreign policy has continued.

Mr. Carter's emphasis on morality in foreign policy was largely due to his perception that America needed to restore confidence in its own democratic processes after Vietnam and Watergate. However, the perception of Asian nations, including South Korea, was that, instead of rectifying Kissinger's "amorality," Mr. Carter had swung the United States from one extreme, indifference, to another, over-concern, resulting in unacceptable interference in their internal affairs. [Ref. 56: p.235]

The policy of pursuing a consistent human rights policy in South Korea met with a number of obstacles. First, U.S. security interests in Northeast Asia were still firmly tied to a viable and strong South Korean government. Secondly, South Korea firmly opposed the United States linking security assistance to human rights pressures, and Thirdly, the South Korean government was becoming less willing to bow to American influence when it came to matters they considered internal.

In 1979, Carter visited South Korea for the purpose of alleviating the South Korean and Japanese concern over United States commitments to South Korea, of applying new pressure on Seoul for human rights reform. He did the latter by talking with President Park on a live telecast broadcast to the entire South Korea countryside. He cited that the economic progress achieved by the South Koreans could be "matched by similar progress through the realization of basic human aspirations in political and human rights." The South Koreans were not happy over the lecture nor did they comprehend Mr. Carter's logic on human rights. One Seoul official put it: [Ref. 57: pp.240-241]

Sometimes it seems the U.S. asks much more of its friends than of countries that do not even try to measure up to American ideas on things like human rights.

The Carter style of implementing stated policy has disturbed and perplexed Asian allies especially South Korea and Japan. The fact that President Carter announced the U.S. troop withdrawal plan without prior consultations with Japan angered leaders in Tokyo, who are as much concerned with stability on the Korean peninsula as are South Koreans.

Generally speaking, U.S.-South Korean relations passed through three phases during the Carter administration. Its first two years constituted the first phase, when the

relationship between the two countries sank to its lowest point. During this period, Carter announced his troop withdrawal plan, the U.S. investigation of the Korean lobbying scandal was conducted in full steam, and the U.S. government assumed what South Korean officials described as a "hectoring" attitude concerning the human-rights situation in Korea.

During the second phase, which began toward the end of 1978 and lasted until the assassination of President Park Chung-hee in October 1979, the Koreagate investigations came to an end, and President Carter reversed his troop-withdrawal decision. Relations gradually improved as the Carter Administration moved closer to the South Korean view about North Korea's military threat as well as about the strategic importance to the United States of the Korean peninsula.

The third phase of the Carter policy toward Korea began with the death of President Park in October 1979. In the post-Park period, the United States was primarily concerned with South Korean security, lest North Korea be tempted to take military advantage of the post-Park transition. Mindful of the authoritarian nature of the Park regime, however, the U.S. was also intent upon playing a key role in facilitating a smooth transition to a more stable and competitive political system.

The main source of strain between the two countries, which persisted toward the end of the Carter administration

was what the South Korean government considered to be unwarranted interference in the name of human rights and democracy in Korea's internal affairs. The Carter administration did not seem to understand the limited nature of U.S. leverage in the Korean domestic political process.

IV. KOREAN PERCEPTIONS OF AMERICA

A. GENERAL PERCEPTION

What are the perceptions that Koreans have of America and its people? The answer to these questions are necessarily limited because it is impossible to know all the different perceptions that individual Koreans hold.

Generally speaking, Koreans tend to view America in a very favorable light. They like and admire America. They believe a firm alliance with her is essential to Korea's national security, brings economic benefits, and promises freedom and democracy. Apart from this general trend, there are some Koreans who detest what they regard as America's "big power" arrogance; those who abhor Korea's "subjugation" to American interests, and those who believe that "American democracy" means nothing but confusion and disorder.

In spite of complexities in perceptions, I believe that the way America is perceived in Korea may be summarized as follows:

First, America is viewed as a wealthy nation, with unrivaled leadership in science and technology and unsurpassed living standards. This positive image has been reinforced by the perception that American economic assistance to Korea over the past has been instrumental in bringing about the recent

growth of the Korean economy.

Second, America is viewed as a land of liberty, democracy, and justice. This perception is particularly significant in Korea because Koreans have looked on America as the most glorious model of freedom and human rights.

Third, America is considered as a big and powerful country. Such a perception is not unique to the Koreans, but, since Koreans attach great significance to America's role as a leading free-world power and her strong defense commitments to Korea, they have a particularly favorable perception of America in this regard.

Fourth, America is viewed as a land of opportunity where individual efforts and abilities are richly rewarded. A great aspiration of generations of Korean youth has been to go to America and study. Today, a great many Koreans see a land of promise, where they would like to emigrate.

Fifth, on the negative side, America is viewed as a nation where pragmatism is so dominant that material and utilitarian values are often prized above all else, in the name of rationalism and realistic considerations. Many Koreans feel that this pragmatic approach is inimical to their way of thinking.

Sixth, America is viewed as a nation where morality is breaking down fast, as evidenced by rampant teenage crime and numerous divorces. Koreans, accustomed to a Confucian image of

life, generally find such social trends in America repugnant.

Seventh, America is viewed as a nation whose policy toward Korea has been inconsistent. A notable example is a series of policy shifts regarding a plan to withdraw American troops from Korea. Many Koreans hold this view despite their appreciation of America's contributions to Korean security and economic development. Many Koreans are also unhappy about what they regard as America's failure to give primary consideration to Korean interests over Japan and China.

The above list is by no means complete. But what is indicated is that the Korean perceptions of America are very favorable as a whole. What are the chief psychological bases for such a favorable perception? Perhaps the most significant factor is the big-power and small power relationship, in which America plays the role of the protector. This relationship has led Koreans to develop a basic attitude of appreciation and even dependence based on Confucian thought. Another fact is that Koreans have regarded America as the model for their own nation building. America was considered the ideal state, blessed with liberty, democracy, and social justice, as well as a thriving free-enterprise economy. This situation may be similar to that of communists looking to the USSR as their nation building model.

B. THE POSITIVE PERCEPTION

1. America as a Protector

To most Koreans, America has long been their favorite country. This has been the case despite the fact that Americans have often shown little or no interests in Korea, have generally held an unfavorable view of Koreans, and have even wished to keep Korea at arm's length.

The American image in Korea has been a generally favorable one throughout the history of relations. Major factors contributing to this favorable image seem to be that Koreans expect America to play the role of Protector; that America is a model for the kind of country Korea wishes to be, complete with freedom, democracy, and social justice, and has a free-enterprise system.

In the past, Koreans thought America was a country that "helps the weak and protects justice." Such a perception persists even today, according to Baek Nak Joon (The President of Younsei University of Korea) "Of all the nations in the world, if there ever was a nation that is not selfish, it must be America. America is basically interested in helping and cooperating with others. America wants to assist and leads smaller nations, rather than exploit them." [Ref. 59:p.171] Also, Premier Hur Jung in 1960, said in his interview with Korean Daily: [Ref. 58:p.171]

In a word, we should give thanks to America. Modern

civilization is Christian civilization and that was introduced by America... Where can we find such a country in the world protecting our peace and pacific security? Therefore, we should keep friendly relations with America forever.

As mentioned above, Koreans have a tendency to consider America as a very favorable way from the past. In response to the question "Which nation is most friendly to Korea?" in a survey, 83% picked America. In a more recent survey(November 1981) 60.6% picked America as their favorite nation, while 9.4% chose Switzerland, 7.7% Israel, 4.3% Great Britain, and 2.7% France[Ref.59:p.136]

The result of these two surveys, taken 16 years apart, show that a great majority of Koreans continue to favor America, by a large margin, over other countries. One reason that Koreans like America so much may be found in Korea's need for help in preserving peace and security in Korea. Throughout history, the Korean peninsula has been a battle ground for power struggles among its stronger neighbors; Japan, Russia, and China. Koreans regard America as someone who could help protect Korea from the intrusion of its neighbors despite Korea's geographical location.

Korea's current relationship with America is likened by more than a few observers to the relationship that Korea used to have with China for many centuries. This from Dong A-Ilbo (Korean Daily newspaper): [Ref.60:p.137]

Like the Meyong Dynasty(ancient Chinese government)

Heavenly Army which came to the rescue of the Korea's Yi Dynasty, during Imjin Waeran(war with Japan in 1592), America, by coming to the aid of Korea, has left a strong impression on Koreans as a "savior." This sense of gratitude toward America and the tendency to rely on America have been so deeply ingrained in the minds of Koreans that their spirit of self-reliance and independence has been seriously disoriented and eroded.

It must be noted that a substantial number of Koreans have shown tendencies to view the Korean-American relations from the perspective of the Confucian order. This tendency has been particularly pronounced among Korea's elite. It has led some Koreans into a state of mind where they felt as though it were Americans' responsibilities for insuring Korea's security and democracy. But these tendency have now diminished and weakened to a great degree.

The idea of enlisting the help of America goes back to 1882. Even before the Korean-American Treaty of 1882 was signed, many of the Korean power elite contemplated ties with the United States. The decision to establish treaty relations with America was based on the belief that America's support was essential if Korea was to retain her integrity. Some Koreans viewed the Chemulpo's (or Shufeldt) Treaty as a wedge to free Korea from Chinese domination, and when General Foote arrived in Korea in May 1883 as the first American minister to Korea, the Korean King "danced with joy," for he along with others regarded the United States as the "symbol of a beneficent power that would indisputably guarantee the

integrity of the Korean nation." [Ref.61:p.12]

Anyway, in May 1882, Korea signed the Treaty of Amity and Commerce with America, a power without territorial ambitions, convinced that America was trustworthy and friendly. Article I of the treaty read in part: "If other powers deal unjustly or oppressively with either Government, the other will exert their good offices to bring about an amicable arrangement, thus showing their friendly feelings." [Ref. 62: p.21] The Koreans mistook this for a solid commitment. America signed the treaty because she was interested in protecting and promoting her commercial interests and in facilitating the work of the missionaries. However, the Korean government at the time was very accommodating and friendly to America in many areas. Believing that the United States was a friendly and beneficent power capable of protecting Korea's independence, the Korean King took positive steps to promote close ties with the United States; he promoted confidential relationships with American ministers, he sought American drill masters for his army, he employed American teachers for the school for the children of nobility, he employed Americans in important government positions, he made social grants to American-sponsored educational institutions, and he stood firm on his decision to establish diplomatic offices in the United States despite the strong opposition from China and Japan.

When World War II broke out, America left its isolationism behind, switched to a policy of international interventionism, and emerged as a principal architect and protector of a new world order. In contrast to the period between 1910 and 1945, during which the U.S. paid scant attention to the difficult situation of the Korean people under Japanese colonial control, the U.S. became increasingly involved in the affairs of the Koreans following the termination of World War II.

After a brief period of uncertainties from 1948 to 1950, cordial relations developed between the U.S., and Korea. America intervened in the Korean war and performed the role of protector. She built, equipped, and helped maintain South Korean Military forces, and stationed U.S. forces in the South Korea to guard against a renewed attack from the North. The United States and its allies fought the North Korean and Chinese communists and preserved South Korea. Naturally, the Korean government and people displayed their traditional pro-American sentiments.

The American commitment to South Korea's national security after 1953, and U.S. economic and other forms of aid not only sustained the life of the nation, but also helped South Korea to achieve what it calls "The Miracle of Han River" during the past decades.

On August 7, 1953 the United States initiated a draft

of the mutual security pact with South Korea and guaranteed the security of South Korea. A final draft of the mutual security pact was initiated in Washington on October 1 1953, and when Secretary Dulles presented the treaty to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, he pointed out that the primary purpose of the pact was to give the notice to the communists "beyond any possibility of misinterpretation, that the United States would not be indifferent to any new communist aggression in Korea." [Ref. 63:p.20]

When the assassination of President Park plunged Korea into political confusion in 1979, America quickly dispatched the seventh Fleet to Korean waters as a deterrence against North Korean moves. Although Korea has made great strides in economic development and moved gradually into a relationship of interdependence with America, Korea's military strength has not shown a corresponding growth.

In a word, with the help of an American guarantee for the security of South Korea, together with an enormous amount of American economic and military aid, South Korea not only achieved a remarkable economic development, but also brought about an astonishing degree of cultural and social changes. But the possibility of the national unification of Korea remains as remote as ever, while tensions did not subside in Korea, making the improvement of political in Korea quite difficult.

2. AS A MODEL FOR NATION BUILDING

When Korea was forced to open its doors to the rest of the world, first, by the Japanese in 1876, then, even wider by the United States in 1882, the aging and impotent government of Korea found itself powerless in the game of imperialist power politics and was totally unprepared to guide the shocked nation into a new world of violently different order.

But upon opening the door to the Western World, Korea was dashing headlong into an era of enlightenment and opened her doors to modernization. And, of all Occidental nations, America was the Koreans' chosen model of modern society.

Suddenly confronted with the vitality of Western culture during the latter half of the 19th century, Koreans blamed their own political and cultural tradition for all the stagnancy, ineffectiveness, and injustice in their society. "The whole nation was waiting for something fresh and powerful from somewhere to come in to lift her spirit up from the state of despair." Thus Koreans were highly receptive to the political, social, and cultural ideas and institutions that Americans brought with them after second World War II. The dissemination of these ideas and institutions was all the more rapid and fundamental, because they were part of the culture of a welcome liberator and, later, a powerful ally in the Koreans' struggle for survival in the Korean war. [Ref. 64:p.197]

From the very early days, Korean interactions with American culture have been most intense and pervasive. Despite the high hopes that some political leaders, particularly King Kojong, placed the American role as a friendly mediator in the colonialistic power struggle for hegemony on the Korean peninsula, political and commercial relations between Korea and America during the closing decades of the 19th century were insignificant.

Evidently, it is clear that it was rather the activities of American Protestant missionaries that made lasting impressions on Koreans and prepared the groundwork for the massive influx of American culture into Korea after 1945. Since the first American missionary arrived in Korea in September 1884, many others followed him quickly and soon began their work in varied fields. Their activities in all fields were well received by the Koreans from the very beginning and by the time the Japanese absorbed Korea into their expanding empire in 1910, there were "altogether 807 churches, 200,000 converts, over 400 Korean pastors, 257 foreign missionaries, 350 schools directly attached to Christian missions, 15,000 students receiving instruction from Christian missionaries, and 15 hospitals under mission management" [Ref. 65: p.196]. Starting in the summer of 1884, the missionaries were admitted into the country, although the ban on the propagation of Christianity was not yet officially

lifted until 1888. It appears that the government of Korea wanted specifically the "Americans" to do some of the urgent works for modernization of the country, which included Western medical and educational works.

In the minds of many Koreans, American Protestantism was also a repository of social and political ideas for reforms needed in the Korean society. Koreans at this time were concerned with the problem of averting the fate of colonization, and this aim in the long run could be achieved by marking the nation strong through social reforms and modern education. One of the ways in which the American Protestants carried out their missionary work was through education. They were the first to establish modern educational institutions in Korea, and many Koreans attracted to them.

American missionaries, meanwhile, kept on teaching revolutionary ideologies of democracy, as well as Christian ideals. So Chae-pill, Syngman Lee, and Yun Chi-Ho, who were among the first Koreans to study in America, came home and organized Tongnip Hyobhoe (The independent club), the first western-oriented political organization. The group sought to promote ideas of freedom and equality and advocated equality and a constitutional government. Almost all historians agree with that Dr. So Che-pil was the first man who did the most for the awakening of the political and social consciousness in the Koreans.

Upon his return from America, he decided to devote his energies to the education of the masses which he felt Korea needed most urgently. To do this, he chose to publish a newspaper, THE INDEPENDENT. In an article "what Korea needs most?" published with the help of the Methodist Missionary H.G. Appenzella as one of its editors, Dr. So wrote:

[Ref. 66:p.200]

My purpose of this paper is not to discuss politics, but to endeavor to bring before the public my ideas as to how to bring about the solution of this grave problem...Without education the people will never understand the good intentions of the government and without education the government officers will never make good laws...There may be several methods of relief, but education is one of the most effective and permanent means.

Also, in the editorial of the October 7, 1897 issue of THE INDEPENDENT he wrote:

At the time we first began publications, our basic intention was to inform the Korean people about world happenings... Moreover, we decided that the articles should deal with both the right and the wrong things people do so as to bring censure down on those who do wrong and to recommend those who do right things.

As the above quotes indicate, THE INDEPENDENT was not only to inform the masses of the things happening in the world, but to make them think actively on the matters of political and social concerns and urge them to come out of apathy. So Che-pil wrote most of its 776 editorials himself. Through these editorials, he taught that "all men were created equal by God, and the existing inequality in Korea was, therefore, against

the will of God, the individual human rights enjoyed by the Westerners were the rewards they earned through struggle, and Koreans, too, must struggle to earn the same right."

[Ref. 67:p.413] This thought was implanted in the minds of Koreans. Thus American ideologies, which were introduced by Seo, gradually gained support in the Korean society. Affected by these thoughts, many missionary schools were founded as a base of nation building. In short, the ultimate goals of mission school education were not merely to teach Western curriculum, but, more importantly, to restore in the Koreans the sense of pride and accomplishment by earning their own education through manual work, and to train them to be Christian workers for their own people.

When Dong-A Ilbo (Korean Dailynews) was founded in 1920, it declared "Democracy is our objective" as editorial principles. When a group of American lawmakers visited Korea in the same year, the newspaper said in an editorial welcoming the visitors: [Ref.68: p.144]

America is a refuge for the persecuted and a safe harbor for the oppressed. Countless are those who were accepted by your benign land away from attacks on their conscience. Countless are those who, fleeing from a thousand shocks of persecution, found liberty among your masses. Behold. The eyes of all the oppressed peoples of the world are lifted toward America. Their minds open toward America with longings... Deprived, oppressed and powerless though we are, our objective is clear. We will abide by the truth, strive according to democracy, and achieve liberation and freedom; We shall build a nation of wealth, decency and strength, which will please God. This is our desire, our faith and our ideal.

After being liberated from Japan at the end of world war II, Korea tried to follow the model of America in many respects based on the principle of freedom, democracy, and social justice. In 1948, a constitutional government was established for the first time in history with American-sponsored free elections. Independence and democracy were realized at long last. But the soil was arid, the environment was too harsh, for this tree of democracy to grow. Trial and error repeated. Democratic development lagged far behind the military, economic, and social progress. So sometimes Koreans were suspicious about American democracy. In spite of this reality, the great majority of Koreans still favor American ideologies and social systems, and this propensity is chiefly responsible for their overwhelmingly favorable opinion on America.

B. NEGATIVE PERCEPTIONS

1. HISTORICAL PERCEPTION

(a) First Disappointment

If the Sino-Japanese war was the first test for American-Korean relations, the Russo-Japanese war brought a second severe test. The Japanese domination of Korea was so much advanced by 1903 that Korea was not even an issue during the Russo-Japanese pre-war negotiations of 1903-1904, and the Japanese victory in the war sealed the fate of Korea. During

the war, the United States judicially carried out the traditional policy of neutrality. Secretary Hay instructed Allen soon after the war broke out: "Presume you will do all possible for the protection of American interests consistent with absolute neutrality." The desperate Korean government turned to Allen for help, but he only carried out the policy of neutrality throughout the entire period of the war.

[Ref. 69: p.28]

At that time, Korea received little political assistance from the United States. The U.S. maintained its strict neutrality in the Sino-Japanese war, and when the Korean emperor asked the American Minister Allen to solicit his government's aid to establish Korea's political neutrality to protect her independence, President McKinley refused to act. Koreans were disappointed. America had not only failed to meet their expectation of help, but had even refused to extend her "good offices" as stipulated in Article I of the 1882 treaty.

The main controversy regarding Roosevelt's Korean policy centers around the issue of offering good offices for the Koreans as specified in the first article of the 1882 treaty and the Taft-Katsura Memorandum of 1905. The entire good office clause reads: "If other powers deal unjustly or oppressively with either government, the other will exert their good offices, and being informed of the case, to bring about an amicable arrangement, thus showing their friendly

feelings." Philip L. Bridgham among others, was very clear about the United States policy toward Korea under the leadership of Roosevelt. He said "The United States was guilty of violating both in spirit and substance a treaty." [Ref.70: p.28] At that time, the main difficulty the Koreans had was informing the Americans. The Koreans made at least four serious efforts to reach the President in the winter of 1905, but all of them failed because Roosevelt took a formalistic view and told them to come through an official diplomatic channel which was already under the Japanese control.

On his way to the Philippines in the summer of 1905, Taft visited Tokyo and had a conversation with the Japanese Prime Minister Katsura on the subjects of Korea and the Philippines. The memorandum of the conversation became later a source of scholarly controversy. Whether it was an "honest exchange of view," a "deal," or an understanding, the Japanese thought the American government gave them a sanction for taking over Korea, even before the conclusion of the Portsmouth Peace Conference.

Once Korea was forced to sign the protectorate treaty with Japan in 1905, the American legation in Seoul was the first foreign mission to pull out. The United States closed down its legation in Seoul without giving an "expression of sympathy" to the Korean or "waiting till the

funeral was over." After that, other foreign missions left Seoul "like the stampede of rats from a sinking ship." [Ref. 71: p.48] The Koreans felt betrayed. Evidently, Korea at the time did not know America, nor did she know that there was no such words as "compassion" and "pity" in the lexicon of international relations.

The United States, by means of the Taft-Katsura agreement, had obtained from Japan assurances that she would not turn her aggression in the direction of the Philippine Islands, and in doing so, had subordinated Korea's national interests to her own. But to the Koreans, this became known as the "first" great disappointment. But the United States might not have anticipated the Japanese annexation of Korea when the Taft-Katsura Memorandum of July 1905 was exchanged between the U.S., and Japan. However, the policy adopted and actions taken during the Roosevelt administration contributed to the demise of the Korean nations in 1910.

(b) The Second Disappointment

Japan continued in her objective of total dominance over Korea and on August 22, 1910, Japan annexed Korea and made it a part of the Japanese empire. Korean nationalism was mainly of a pacifist nature under the Japanese, but there were demonstrations which were put down with great brutality by the Japanese. The most important of these occurred on 1 March 1919 and is still recognized in

Korea as a national holiday. This particular demonstration was encouraged by President Wilson's address to the Congress on January 9, 1918, where he enunciated his famous "Fourteen Points". To the Korean nationalists the call for self-determination and "principle of justice to all people and nationalities, and their right to live on equal terms of liberty and safety with one another, whether they be strong or weak" was the needed encouragement to speak out against the Japanese, and this they did in a Korean Declaration of Independence. This was read to the Korean public by the thirty-three patriots who signed the declaration. Immediately afterward, these men offered themselves up for arrest and this was the beginning of the Independence Movement, which would be suppressed over the course of the next few months with great brutality.

During this time many Korean nationalists who were living in the United States petitioned President Wilson to intervene in the Korean affair. They quoted Article I of the 1882 treaty and the principle of the League of Nations. President Wilson was said to be in great anguish over the plight of the Korean people, but could not help them because of the international agreements that had been concluded in good faith with Japan. This is considered by modern day Koreans as the second great disappointment.

(c) Third Despair

At the end of World War II, American troops landed in Korea as "liberators," beginning a new history of America's role as a direct participant in Korean affairs. America had also taken the initiative in dividing the Korean peninsula in two, along a line drawn for military convenience. Later, super powers proposed a five-year trusteeship arrangement for Korea. These developments were merely additional series of expectations and frustrations in Korea's relations with America.

In 1948, America helped establish a new government in South Korea, but soon afterwards, pulled her troops out of Korea without bothering to prepare and equip the country adequately for its self defense. This was in sharp contrast to what Soviet Russia did for North Korea, which became an adequately supplied and equipped forwards base for communism. Despite strong objections of the South Korean government, the United States withdrew its troops from Korea by the end of June 1949, leaving behind poorly indoctrinated, trained, and supplied soldiers of the newly created Korean army and a small United States Military Advisory Group. Furthermore, a high American official made a public announcement to the effect that Korea was outside the defense perimeters of America. Secretary of State Dean Acheson told a Congressional Committee that the American line of defense in the Far East extends from

Alaska through the Aleutian chain, Japan, and Okinawa to the Philippines and made no mention of Korea. In his remarks of January 12, 1950 in a speech before the National Press Club, he reiterated that the United States defense perimeter runs along the Aleutian islands to Japan, and from Japan to the Philippines, and again he made no reference to Korea.

South Korea, which seemed to have been abandoned by the United States, was invaded by the North Korean communist troops on June 25, 1950. As many had feared, the Korean War finally came. "The Korean war began in a way in which wars often begin," said Secretary of State John Foster Dulles in 1953, "a potential aggressor miscalculated." [Ref. 72: p.20] At least to the Koreans point of view, a tragedy was invited to some degree by America's shortsightedness.

The devastating war in Korea was brought to an end with the signing of the Korean armistice on July 27, 1953. But contrary to the spirit and letters of the joint statement of August 7, 1953, the United States failed to consult further regarding the attainment of a unified, free and independent Korea. Be that as it may, the uneasy truce in Korea was maintained for a quarter of a century, although unending border clashes and bloody events have occurred across the 150-mile truce line.

2. BIG POWER ARROGANCE

Ordinary Koreans have few opportunities for direct contact with Americans. Most Americans in Korea are missionaries, businessmen, teachers, and soldier. Therefore the image of America in the minds of the ordinary Koreans is often formed on the basis of the behavior of American servicemen stationed in Korea. Especially during the Korean war, there were eight American divisions in Korea. The G.I. life style provided occasional shocks to Koreans. Incidents and situations that Koreans found particularly unpalatable and offensive included: daughters of upright families raped by soldiers; prostitution doing a thriving business near military bases; Amerasian children being left behind by American soldier fathers. Whenever an American military base is set up, traditional Korean mores and living styles tended to be disturbed.

When American forces occupied South Korea at the end of World War II, there was a maxim that made the rounds among Koreans: "Never trust the Americans; don't be fooled by the Soviets; the Japan will rise up again." [Ref. 73: p.42] It was not surprising that the Koreans were warned about the Soviets or Japanese. But why should America or the Americans have been downgraded at that juncture? It is likely that the maxim reflects the pains of disappointment which Koreans felt in their relations with America between 1882 and 1945. When

Koreans expected full independence as soon as the Japanese domination ended, the American military sought to enlist the cooperation of Japanese officials in governing Korea.

Even though, the American forces rescued Korea from the aggression of North Korea in the Korean War and supported in many respects, the Korean attitude toward America has been tinged with a touch of mistrust. Occasionally, Korean sentiment flares up in anger against America, and becomes anti-American. the Koreans are susceptible to the pain of indignity when they see their interests slighted by the Americans on account of considerations that have to be made in favor of Japan and China; it is considered conceivable that the real motivation for the American intervention in Korea was the defense of Japan. Some have even argued that America signed the Korean-American Mutual Defense Treaty also for the benefit of Japanese security. At that time, one newspaper editorial stated: "Once again we Koreans are afraid that history will repeat itself and let America attempt to turn Korea over Japan, Can Koreans afford to continue to put faith in America?" [Ref.74: p.147]

When violent protests were staged in Korea against Korean-Japanese negotiations for normalization of relations in the mid-1960s, the protests were, at least partially, aimed at America as well. The indignation was directed toward the American policy of pushing for the normalization of Korea-

Japan relations and of exerting influence in Japan's favor during the negotiations.

In the early 1970s, America and China who were adversaries in the Vietnam war decided to pull out of Vietnam. America proclaimed the Nixon Doctrine and proceeded first to withdraw one division from South Korea, even before withdrawing forces from Vietnam. In making the decision on the troop withdrawal from Korea, America did not even consult with Korea.

In January 1977, Carter sent Vice-President Mondale on an urgent mission to key allies for consultations. While in Japan, Mondale briefed Japanese leaders on the American policy on the troop withdrawal from Korea. But he did not visit Korea, only two hours away from Japan. This incident stimulated and amplified Korean's negative perceptions on America.

3. ANTI-AMERICANISM

Anti-Americanism is on the rise in South Korea today. The rise of anti-U.S. sentiment has been confirmed by some Americans who have expressed deep concern that it is likely to intensify, and an increasing number are reportedly taking the matter seriously. Furthermore, there are reports that the "honeymoon relationship" between the ROK and the U.S. is drawing to a close. [Ref. 75: p.750] But it should be pointed out that Korean anti-Americanism reveals a vast gap between

the views and values of an older Korean generation that witnessed the Communist revolution in the North and the Korean war and those of the post-war generation with no direct memories of the war itself. In Korea today, those aged 20 to 40 account for 58 percent, or about 14 million people, of all eligible voters. This new generation, in search of Korea's own national identity, is assertive, nationalistic, and is critical of what it sees as South Korea's subservient position to the United States and Japan.

But historically, anti-Americanism can be seen as a resurgence of the dormant Korean nationalism of the left which was crushed by the American occupation authorities and the rightist government of Syngman Lee in the late 1940s and 1950s. The renaissance of leftist ideology coincides with a search for a scapegoat for the country's problem. The United States is an ideal scapegoat-hegemonic, rightist, intrusive, ubiquitous, distant, and alien. Moreover, since Koreans have been socialized to believe that America's mission is to safeguard democracy and freedom in the world, many feel betrayed by certain actions and inactions of the United States in Korea. Today, while the bulk of the Korean population still retains a favorable image of the United States, critical and even hostile views are increasing.

In theory, Koreans should be grateful to the United States for many things. The U.S. rescued South Korea in the

Korean War and gave vast amounts of aid for economic reconstruction. Korea's economic miracle became a model for the Third World. The United States keeps its 40,000 troops to deter North Korean aggression in spite of great deficit. Thanks to ROK's security preparedness with American help, Seoul has been able to sponsor numerous international events, including the Asian Games in the fall of 1986 and the Seoul Olympic Games in 1988. Moreover, compared to a North Korea, South Korea enjoys an image of freedom and dynamism. Visiting U.S. dignitaries always speak well of Korea's outstanding performance in the security and economic fields. Today, South Korea is the twelfth most active trading country in the world and America's seventh greatest trading partner. Ever increasing number of Korean immigrants continue to settle in the United States, and thousand of Korean students study in the U.S. American-educated Koreans occupy important and sensitive positions in the ROK government. Evidently, there is no anti-Americanism at the official level, and on one level there is little basis for anti-Americanism in South Korea. Perhaps this is why Gaston Sigar, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, expressed puzzlement over anti-Americanism in South Korea during his visit to Seoul in November 1986. [Ref. 76: p.9]

However, there is another Korean face, dark and sinister. Victims of political repression, torture, and

inhuman labor practices have their own reasons for feeling bitter about their government's close ties with the United States. Conversation with politicians, students, and intellectuals in Korea make it clear that the Korean anti-American sentiment is not simply shared by what the government calls an extremely small group of so-called "impure elements" in Korean society. They see the resentment against the United States as an expression of broad-based malaise, of the feeling that something has gone terribly wrong in Korea since the end of World War II. The division of the Korean peninsula by the great powers, the Korean War, the military coups of 1961 and 1979-1980, the Kwangju democratization movement in 1980, the lack of progress toward reunification, the pervasive American economic and cultural influences, the absence of full political freedom and a growing gap between the rich and the poor--every one of these issues has something to do with the United States either directly or indirectly. And these issues have become the focal points of debate among attentive people in recent years. [Ref. 77: p.10]

There seems to be two different types of such anti-American sentiments. First, there is resentment against intervention and interference coming from the protector. The second type of anti-American feelings stem from the view that America is linked to authoritarian rulers, whose politics run counter to American democratic beliefs, and are unwilling to

provide even moral support for advocates of democracy. Whenever Korea faced serious crises, America took appropriate measures. Every step America takes regarding Korea-- military, diplomatic, or economic-- has a dual meaning at least to some Korean's point of view. On one hand, it is a friendly, supportive act, but on the other hand, it may be considered as an act of interference or intervention. The position of Korea is that America's role should be confined to that of a protector based on the mutual-defense treaty, and America should refrain from interfering in Korea's domestic affairs. This clash of views on what America's role should be has created intense tension in the relations whenever Korea faced political crises such as those in 1952, 1960, and 1961. Such tension mounted to an unprecedented height in the May 1980 political crisis. This prompted one observer to comment that the "special relationship" born in the foxholes during the Korean War had been turned into a marriage of inconvenience." [Ref. 78: p.149]

Also, there are some Koreans who believe and expect that America should take a more active role in support of democracy on Korea. Father John Daley, who has worked at Seogang University in Seoul for 20 years, made this comment on the subject: [Ref. 79: p.149]

Students have an idealistic view of the United States in the sense that they have studied democracy and they feel that the U.S. is powerful, so that the U.S. can do

anything it wishes. They are constantly disappointed when Korean government leaders can not offer the same democracy to Korea and instead curtail the freedom of expression. The U.S., they say, is doing nothing.

According to Farther Daley, some students have been so disillusioned by America that they no longer consider America as a model for an ideal state and they are developing a model of their own, based on what they have learned from Socialist literature.

Anti-Americanism has grown among Koreans basically because of the long association of the two countries and the heavy and influential American presence in South Korea. In his departure interview at an airport news conference, outgoing U.S. Ambassador James R. Lilley emphasized that "the fact that only anti-Americanism, not anti-British or anti-French, exists in South Korea is due to the strong American influence in the country." And one editorial director of the Journal of Commerce pointed out in a speech that "many Koreans resent American influence, ideas and American troops. I am not surprised that such feelings would arise; given the large number of U.S., soldiers in South Korea, it is inevitable that the United States will be blamed for many things."

[Ref. 80:p.750]

Viewed from the above position, anti-Americanism is a very natural sentiment, usually witnessed in countries under the strong influence of foreign powers.

V. RECENT CAUSES OF NEGATIVE PERCEPTIONS

A. CHANGING PERCEPTION

The image of the United States as the special nation began in 1945 when Koreans perceived Americans as liberators who eliminated the hated Japanese imperialist oppression, and when America helped fight in the Korean war, Koreans considered it a savior, and whenever the U.S. gave a hand to Korea in a crisis, Koreans naturally were in the habit of regarding America as a protector. Probably this kind of perception originated in the traditional Asian view of international relations. The so-called sadae relationship between Korea and China was governed by an extrapolation from the Confucian family system in which the younger brother served the older brother and the older recognized a duty to the younger. This kind of relationship and perception was taken for granted in the Koreans' perception system which was deeply affected by the Confucian order throughout history. Because the United States replaced China as the older brother in the traditional relationship, it was natural for Koreans to regard it as a special state, and holding such a unique image of the country has encouraged them to have various expectations of it.

For the past three decades or so, Korea has been one of the most pro-American nations in the world, but younger generations today have no memory of the 1945 liberation, the Korean war or the miserable poverty of the ROK in the 1950s and early 1960s. Similarly, these same younger citizens are less cognizant of the many positive steps the U.S. took to assist Korea in overcoming its difficulties and securing the phenomenal progress made during the post-world war II era. Thus younger Koreans are naturally less ardently pro-American than their elders. But this should be viewed as an inevitable historical pendulum swing rather than an alarming deterioration of Korean goodwill toward Americans.

While the older generation assumes a relatively friendly attitude toward the United States, the "postwar generation" of younger Koreans is critical of the superpower and the situation in South Korea has taken on a new aspect with its coming of age in the 1980s. These Koreans are influential because of their numerical superiority and particularly because of their higher education.

Today, some 62% of eligible voters in South Korea fall between the ages of 20 and 39. The younger generation is increasingly well educated and mobile. University students constitute 3% of the population, compared with 2.0% in the

U.S., and 1.47% in west Germany. Students' views are treated with unusual respect in South Korea because of the traditional Confucian reverence for education. A recent opinion survey of 1497 people rated students as the most influential group in South Korean politics. Compiled with an institute of Seoul National University poll from November 28 to December 31, 1988, the poll found 23.6% of those surveyed said that students are the most influential group, followed by 22.8% rating the military as most influential.[Ref.81: p.752]

Young Koreans witnessed neither the American role in eliminating Japanese colonial rule in their country nor the American sacrifice in the Korean war. Accordingly, they feel that South Korea has no special bond with the U.S. and they bitterly criticize the older generation for being subserviently dependent on America. The younger people look at the U.S. realistically and objectively; unstinting praise and unconditional gratitude are regarded as habits of the past.

However, increasing anti-American sentiment cannot be attributed solely to generational transition. Economic prosperity and the social development it have spurred has given rise to an increasingly sophisticated and educated citizenry, which today displays a multiplicity of opinions. This evolution has been hastened by the political

liberalization of the last several years. It should be recognized that the sharply escalating specter of outspoken anti-Americanism among some political and social groups is, in fact, a testament to the speed and success of democratization in Korea. Just as Americans are not uniformly pro-Israeli, pro-French or pro-Korean, for example, it is understandable that Koreans do not display unanimity in their feelings toward the U.S.

The perception of North Korea as a menace also differs between the generations. Young Koreans do not attach great importance to the South Korean-U.S. mutual security relationship. Indeed, their overriding concern is reunification of the two Koreas, and radical students consider the presence of American troops in South Korea as the main obstacle to national reunification. According to an opinion poll of 551 university students through Korea conducted in October 1988 by a research institute of Seoul National University, 50.6% regarded the United States as "neither a friend nor an enemy, but just a foreign country pursuing its own interests," and 41.2% believed that America "was primarily responsible for the division of Korea in 1945 and is the greatest impediment to Korea's reunification." None of them thinks the superpower "an ally to safeguard liberal democracy

in Korea." As far as American forces are concerned, 60.4% of those polled want the troops to be withdrawn--48.1 because the American troops "make the division of Korea permanent" and 12.3% "because there is little possibility of another war in Korea." Also, 84.5% of the respondents believe that American influence "is as strong as ever" in South Korea, and therefore the current government "is still subordinate to the United States." The professor who conducted this survey remarked that the Korean students' view of America "is never favorable to the nation, but it is hard to think it anti-American. Rather, we regard it as an expression of their efforts to take an objective and neutral attitude toward the United States." Young Koreans believe, in short, that a new, fair relationship should be established between the two countries. The rise of anti-American sentiment among the young generation has provided momentum for the Korean people as a whole to review the relationship between the two countries. According to a survey of 1,403 middle-class Koreans conducted by Hanguk Ilbo, 1987, 90% of the respondents agreed that "the United States is more concerned with its own national interests than with Korea's political development," and 66% of them did not think it desirable that "America makes comments on Korea's democratization." [Ref.82: p.753]

These responses indicate that most Koreans have abandoned the romantic view of America that had long been cherished from their ancestors. The long standing presence of American power and influence in South Korea has inspired among young Koreans a critical view of the U.S., which has spread widely among the people as a whole. In these situations, anti-Americanism is the inevitable consequence of a changing relationship between the two nations.

The long U.S. presence did not by itself lead to the rise of an active anti-American movement in South Korea. Violent demonstrations and, in particular, attacks on American installations have been triggered by the enhancement of national pride among Korean people and especially their discontent with the U.S. role in the course of the struggle for democracy in the country. Today, Koreans share a new stirring of nationalism arising from their country's rapid economic growth and political liberalization. This nationalism was encouraged all the more by the success of the Seoul Olympics. Ambassador Lilley spoke of the "new Korea" in these terms: [Ref.83: p.754]

Today Korea is becoming increasingly well known for its dramatic political transition, which has also occurred with breath taking speed... The political transition affects not only the National Assembly, but every corner of Korean society, as people search for ways to translate

the concept of democracy into reality in school, workplace, and every kind of organization... The Seoul Olympic Games, recognized around world as a truly magnificent achievement, symbolized Korea's new place in the world community. Even before the games, Koreans were looking at their place in the world community and making adjustments in their foreign relationship with the United States.

This new nationalism has given rise to a manifestation of the "hidden" antiforeign feeling of the Korean people, and the main target is Korea's "big brother," the United States. Lilley pointed out "Korea's political transition is giving the public a greater political voice than ever before, and the public is using that freedom to question its relationship with the United States.[Ref.84: p.755]

Some Koreans believe that arrogance, a sense of racial superiority, and a bitter contempt for them have been characteristic of Americans' behavior in the past, and they seek to redress these past wrong and discriminatory relations between the two peoples. Viewed in this way, anti-Americanism seems more an effort to remedy a traditional Korean sentiment, han, a smoldering bitterness about past wrongs.

Increasingly, Koreans are scrutinizing issues and events that heretofore were considered taboo, leading to new and radical theories about U.S. intentions toward the Korean peninsula. However, the revisionist views circulating in Korea

that accuse the U.S. of maliciously dividing the peninsula, opposing reunification, perpetuating authoritarianism, prating economic imperialism and other similar misdeeds are fundamentally incorrect. That the U.S. made policy mistakes in the past is undeniable, but these complex issues do not lend themselves to simplistic black-or-white, right-or-wrong interpretations. In historical analysis as well as current events, the subtle gray areas must also be examined.

With growing frequency, these gray areas are being considered by the Korean people. There is no particular reason to fear, however, that a significant number of Koreans will be fooled by the hyperbolic claims of political extremists. The basic reality remains that close political, economic and security cooperation between the U.S. and the ROK clearly has benefited both nations and should be sustained, although the need for careful and constant fine-tuning of the relationship occasionally will tax the patience and understanding of both sides. [Ref.85: p.20]

Some Koreans are asserting that Korea is no longer an American dependent state, but Americans are unwilling to accept the change and continues to stress only that the U.S. has been the "protector" and "big brother" of Korea. Such an American attitude is sufficient to prompt a public outcry from

Koreans, now full of national pride. Therefore anti-Americanism is the inevitable consequence of a changing relationship between the two nations.

B. SEOUL OLYMPIC

The world witnessed a strange phenomenon in the course of the 1988 Seoul Olympics when Koreans jeered the American teams and cheered the Soviets in games between two superpowers. This means that anti-Americanism has pervaded the Korean people to a considerable extent. The occurrence was mainly triggered by NBC'S unfair and distorted coverage of the Olympics and South Korea, a theft by American swimmers, the disorderliness of the American Olympic team during the opening ceremony, and the damaging of the Olympic flag in the streets of Seoul by American servicemen. Anti-American sentiment has existed in South Korea since 1980, but the 1988 behavior of Koreans proves that it has spread widely and at dramatic speed. Many Koreans are still friendly to Americans in person but they do not hesitate to criticize the United States, and it is obvious that the pro-Americanism of the past has faded.

[Ref.86: p. 749]

Americans landed in Korea more than 40 years ago, and the passage of four decades is long enough for Koreans to raise and seek answers to the basic question, "What really has the

United States been to us?" Many Koreans have now come to look at the United States coolly rather than with emotion, and this result in their criticisms. Observing the "anti-American storm" among Koreans during the Olympics, a professor in Seoul said that "it reveals that anti-American sentiment is not restricted to intellectuals and students. Strictly speaking, it does not mean that Koreans are against the United States, but that they are beginning to understand the real facts about America. Anti-Americanism, in short, is an inevitable consequence of a gradual change in Koreans' perception of the United States. An American living in Seoul, who witnessed rising anti-American feelings during the Olympic period, pointed out that "because Russians are coming to Korea for the first time, they look exotic. We have ,however, been overexposed to Koreans and therefore are at a disadvantage. [Ref. 87: p.751]

The Seoul Olympics hurt the image of the U.S. in Korea in large measure. From the start, the international sports event was dotted with American misdeeds and Korean outcries against them. Many were offended when American athletes, marching into the stadium during the opening ceremonies, broke ranks and held up signs for the television cameras. Koreans thought the act hurt the dignity of an occasion for which many athletes

had been preparing for years. They also felt insulted when the runner Carl Lewis shoved Korean security guards on arrival at Kimp'o airport and the swimmer Matt Biondi refused a glass of tap water for fear of becoming ill. And they were horrified when two American gold medalist swimmers were reported to have stolen a statue from a Seoul hotel.

More serious than these incidents was the distorted NBC coverage of the Olympics and Korea itself. First, NBC reports on the opening ceremony showed nothing about the Han River Festival, which won high praise, and the entrance of the host country's team. Koreans criticized the network's coverage of the unusual boxing brawl, claiming it devoted too much time to the ringside violence instead of to the referee's "unfair" act and the mistake of the world boxing officials. The news organization also was criticized for not giving a full account of the records set by Korea in the Games, even devoting more time to the coverage of China. This was viewed as a condemnation of Korea. Finally, nonsports coverage focused on such topics as sweatshops, prostitution, and foreign adoption of Korean children, which prompted a widespread outcry among Koreans.

It is hard to believe that NBC's distorted reports expressed only the news organization's view of Korea. Rather,

it seems that the American people, American government, and NBC all share the same view of the small country, and that NBC coverage represents the voice of Americans and their government.

C. KWANGJU DEMOCRATIZATION MOVEMENT

Anti-American sentiment was rarely expressed until the end of the 1970s. An overwhelming majority of the Korean people were inclined to thank Americans for what they had done for South Korea, but the general attitude changed drastically after 1980 because U.S. realpolitik led the United States to side with the authoritarian regime of Chun Doo-hwan. The United States has not been helping the cause of democracy in South Korea, because Washington failed to prevent the coup of December 12, 1979, that eventually paved the way for General Chun's ascendancy to power in 1980; it failed to prevent the use of South Korean troops under its command for the suppression of the Kwangju uprising in May 1980, resulting in the death of nearly 200 and numerous injuries and arrests in Kwangju. Furthermore, they have criticized the U.S. not only for supporting the Chun Government but for going out its way to legitimize the government through summit meetings. They tended to view the United States as propping the authoritarian regime in South Korea, instead of supporting the cause of

democracy. [Ref. 88:p.660]

Thus, many Korean intellectuals and students came to believe that the United States stands in the way of democratization of their country. In an interview with Korean journalists, former U.S. Ambassador William Gleysteen analyzed one of the primary causes of anti-Americanism as follows:

[Ref. 89: p.759]

The United States has been associated now with two governments that have come to power by unorthodox means. In 1961 and 1979-1980. Our relations with those governments have been inescapable from a real point of view. But, as a result, some Koreans hold the United States responsible for the actions of those Korean governments--first the Park government, and now the Chun government. That is certainly one factor in anti-Americanism.

Although it could have exercised considerable influence to increase democracy because of long-standing South Korean dependence, the U.S. endorsed Chun's dictatorship as necessary for the stability and security of the Korean peninsula. An American's view maintains that the U.S. does not want friction with the Korean military and that an overt attempt by the U.S. to prevent or roll back South Korean politico-military action would constitute self-inflicted strategic suicide, undercutting the ROK, the U.S. interests in that country and its role in Northeast Asian peace and stability.

Several momentous cases in the 1980s in which the U.S. sided with the authoritarian regimes have drawn much

criticism from the Korean people. After the collapse of Park in October 1979, General Chun seized control of the armed forces on December 12 in a nighttime coup. The moves toward democratization in Korea were partially checked. While the U.S. military publicly protested the coup and the Department of State warned of further unrest if democracy was stalled, the Carter administration did not make a decisive move against Chun. Rather, as the political crisis in Korea intensified over the next six months, the United States grew increasingly to regard Chun and another period of military rule as the only possible alternative for Korea.

On May 17, 1980, Chun's "new military" declared martial law throughout Korea, bringing an abrupt end to the short-lived movement for democracy. The following day students and citizens in Kwangju protested martial law in street demonstrations that escalated almost into an armed revolt. The Kwangju uprising, later officially termed the Kwangju Democratization Movement, ended in severe repression and the death of many people.[ref.90: p.760]

In protest against the U.S., support of the Chun Government, radical student activists bombed the U.S. Information Services libraries in Pusan, Kwangju and Taegu in the early 1980's. In May 1985, 73 students occupied the American Culture Center library in Seoul, demanding among other things, an apology for the alleged U.S. role in the 1980

Kwangju incident. After three days of talks, they were persuaded by U.S. Embassy official to leave the library. In May 1986, radical students staged a violent anti-government and anti-American rally in Inchon. Under the leadership of radical students, it became increasingly fashionable for the anti-government demonstrators to shout anti-American slogans on and off the campuses. [Ref. 91: p.660]

The Kwangju incidents inspired much of the anti-American rhetoric echoing throughout demonstrations across South Korea. Anti-government dissidents have charged the U.S. with acquiescence and complicity in the slaughter, and many Koreans have believed that the United States was at least indirectly responsible for the tragedy by approving the commitment of Korean troops under the authority of the CFC. To opponents of military dictatorship, "Kwangju" became a symbol of U.S. support for the authoritarian regime. From 1982 on, dissidents began to criticize the United States more actively, and finally, for the first time in nearly three decades, the cry, "Yankee, go home," began to heard on South Korean campuses. Militant students have not hesitated to attempt to seize the American embassy, U.S. Information Service facilities, and other American buildings. They have even launched firebomb and stone assault on American military bases and premises used primarily by military family members, and have burned the U.S. flag. Many Koreans, initially shocked, are now little

surprised at such news. This underscore an entirely new dimension in South Korean attitudes.

The Kwangju tragedy remains a symbol of illegitimacy and brutality. No dissidents accept the United States' explanation that it had no authority to prohibit the reassignment of the troops. The so-called "conscientized" groups were persuaded of American complicity in that tragedy and also in the coup led by General Chun. Moreover, the Reagan administration's hasty move to give recognition and public support to Chun by inviting him to be the first foreign head of state to visit President Reagan at the White House made this perception all the more credible.[Ref.92: p.11]

Taking the anti-American sentiment seriously, the U.S. government recently took the unusual step of explaining the American role in the 1980 Kwangju incident. In an official statement issued in June 1989, the United States pointed out that "one cause of increased anti-Americanism in Korea in the 1980s is the false impression held by many Koreans that the U.S. was directly involved in, and significantly responsible for the Kwangju tragedy--a misperception in part fostered by the deception of the Korean authorities at the time, and in part by the restriction on the dissemination of facts" about the Kwangju incident during the Fifth Republic. It was emphasized that the U.S. was never responsible for the slaughter because "neither troops of the Korean Special

Warfare Command(SWC) nor elements of the 20th Division, employed by the Martial Law Command in Kwangju," were under CFC operational command, and the U.S."had neither prior knowledge of the deployment of SWC forces to Kwangju nor responsibility for the actions there." But many Koreans-- especially students, intellectuals, and Kwangju citizens-- are not willing to believe the explanations considering the situation at the time.[Ref. 93: p.762]

D. TRADE FRICTION

1. General perception

Among the challenges and problems confronting U.S.-ROK relations today are the growing pains as the relationship rapidly shifts from one of patronage to partnership. For most of its history, the ROK was burdened with annual trade deficits. That changed in 1986 when Korea registered its first significant current account surplus. In 1987, the surplus swelled to about \$10 billion. Similarly, the ROK has over the last few years begun to run annual bilateral trade surpluses with the U.S. Though the U.S. trade deficit with South Korea is only five percent of its total trade deficit, it has become highly and symbolic in the context of the much more consequential U.S. trade dispute with Japan. However, in 1987,

U.S.-ROK trade favored Korea by about \$10 billion, as shown in Table 1. [Ref. 94:p.40]

TABLE 1. U.S. Trade Deficit with Korea 1982-1987

(\$ billion)

	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987
U.S. Exports	5.3	5.7	5.8	5.7	5.9	8.7
U.S. Imports	6.0	7.1	9.4	10.0	12.7	18.3

Source: U.S. Department of Commerce Data. Trade Net Data Retrieval System

The result is that Seoul has become a target for American protectionist pressure. This situation is straining bilateral relations. The United States has been pressing Korea to open its market wider, while accusing Korea for its unfair trade practices. Some critics charged that South Korea is a "new Japan" that takes advantage of the open U.S. economy yet restricts access to its own markets. In recent years, this has prompted the U.S. to cut Korean textile imports and exclude the ROK from the Generalized System of Preferences program, which offers measured tariff reductions to developing nations. Korea does not feel comfortable with suddenly rising U.S. pressure. Korean college students expressed anti-U.S. sentiments in their street demonstrations. Korean workers

expressed their discontent with the U.S. protectionism. Korean farmers staged demonstrations against the Korean government's decision to import U.S. agricultural products.

Korea has yielded to the U.S. pressure, so has taken several steps over the past several years in response to U.S. concerns. But the United States wants more and faster open from Korea. The ROK government has recently opened a number of its markets to U.S. goods and services, most notably the tobacco and insurance industries. Korea has also eased restrictions on U.S. investment in Korea and expanded ROK investment in the U.S. Seoul is particularly interested in finding ways to adjust its trade with Japan. Despite its growing surplus with the U.S., the ROK's trade with Japan in 1987 favored Tokyo to the tune of \$5 billion. The South Korean government is urging domestic companies to shift their purchases of some items from Japanese to U.S. suppliers.

Still, Seoul currently is under strong pressure from Washington to allow greater American access to a variety of ROK markets. Korean citizens are increasingly critical of this U.S. pressure and charge that Americans fail to take into account the vulnerability of the ROK's export-driven and heavily indebted economy. ROK public reaction to U.S. pressure

for market access and cuts in certain Korean exports to the U.S. has been highly emotional and nationalistic. Many Koreans are particularly stung by charges that they represent a "new Japan" and feel it unfair that their fledgling economic clout is being compared to that of a superpower. They charge that the ROK is becoming a scapegoat which Americans use to vent their frustrations over U.S. trade friction with Japan. Many Koreans also feel that the U.S., after generously supporting the ROK through the hard times of the 1950s and 1960s, now ironically is punishing Korea for its success.

Korean college students and workers have violently expressed anti-U.S. feelings in street demonstrations. Their sentiments are echoed in Korean society at large. Yet U.S. pressure has persisted. This pressure upsets Koreans, because they "remember Americans as the ones who saved them from the North in the Korean War and helped us out of poverty."

[Ref. 95: p.325]

In an article about U.S. trade pressure published by the Asian Wall Street Journal in 1989, one American businessman stationed in Seoul put it this way: "Although these efforts are designed to help American traders like me, I have seen all too often how the best laid political plans

can actually make it more difficult for us to maintain a foothold in these countries...U.S. trade bullying fans the flames of anti-Americanism here, and American business pays for that. Even though Washington has some legitimate gripes about closed Korean markets, Koreans feel that they are being pushed around and that the U.S. does not recognize the great strides they have made." [Ref. 96: p.8]

On the other hand, democratization in Korea has widened the scope of political participation and slowed the pace of the government's decision-making process. Sweeping economic reforms are no longer dictated by the Blue House. Rather the National Assembly and a plethora of interests groups now demand their say in the policy debate. And, as is the case in the U.S., trade policy in Korea is highly politicized and must be conducted with a maximum level of consensus-building. Thus, Koreans hope that the U.S. attempt to show appropriate sensitivity in its efforts to sustain productive trade ties.

2. Koreans Attitude toward Trade Friction

Until the mid-1960s, trade between Korea and the United States was very modest. Indeed, their trade relationship was a poor cousin to the security alliance that

dominated the Korea-U.S. partnership. Over the last twenty years, however, this trade relationship has undergone dramatic change. During the period of 1965 to 1985, two-way trade between the two countries grew at the remarkable average annual growth rate of 23%, fueled in large part by the tremendous growth in the Korean economy. As a result, the United States is today the biggest market for Korea's goods, while Korea is soon to become America's sixth largest trading partner. [Ref. 97: p.35]

In the course of this transformation, the Korea -U.S. trade relationship has become an integral and vital element of overall Korea-U.S. ties. Korea depends a great deal upon its trade with the United States and access to its markets to carry out its defense commitment and maintain peace in Northeast Asia. Every year, Korea spends some 6% of its GNP for defense. Without continued economic progress, Korea could not afford these outlays and at the same time provide progressively higher standards of living for all its citizens. And, without further economic progress, it would become considerably more difficult for the nation to carry out the commitment to democracy that it shares so closely with the United States.

In recent years, however, Korea-U.S. trade relationship have come under considerable strain. And then, what are the major pending issues in trade? The U.S. government has persistently demanded of South Korea the following: (1) steady appreciation of the "Korean won" against the dollar as a means of lessening the trade deficit; (2) more import liberalization for American commodities such as grains, beef and others; (3) recognition of American intellectual properties; (4) allowing more market access for U.S. service industries; (5) lowering the tariffs on such American products as cigarettes; (6) allowing more market access for U.S., insurance, banking, and advertising firms; and (7) stopping the dumping of Korean products in the American market. Because of strenuous pressure from the United States, the South Korean government has implemented some of these demands into its economic policy. Many of the pending issues, however, have not been resolved and continue being thorny issues for both government. [Ref. 98: p.235]

To some degree, the trade frictions between the two countries have been due to the very pace and extent of transformation in their trade relationship. While both countries have had to adjust to these changes, the adjustment

process in the United States has been made particularly difficult by its huge overall trade deficit, which has given rise to unprecedently widespread demands for protection. In response, U.S. policymakers have launched efforts to open up markets overseas by combatting what they perceived to be unfair trade practices on the part of U.S. trading partners. Impatient with the pace of Korea's marketopening, United States has actively sought to gain access to Korea's markets.

[Ref.99: p.36]

The strong reaction among Koreans reflected the deep frustration they have felt over their trade relations with the United States in recent years. For one thing, Koreans were dismayed to find that in exerting pressure on Korea to open its markets, the U.S. was mistaking Korea for Japan. Despite a few superficial similarities, Korea is not a "second Japan." Koreans' perception is that Korea is a fair trade partner which plays by the rules and Korean firms no longer receive significant government funding or financial support, and they obey trade laws overseas.

A further source of frustration on the part of Koreans is that the United States has tended to gloss over the economic constraints that Korea has faced in liberalizing its

markets. The United States seems to overlook the fact, for example, that Korea is the fourth largest debtor nation in the world with a foreign debt of over \$47 billion and that most of this amount is owed to U.S. financial institutions. Furthermore, the United States does not appear to take into account the tremendous defense burden which Korea shoulders, which amounts to some 6% of GNP per year.[Ref.100: p.37] Koreans are a very nationalistic people who are highly sensitive to foreign pressure. Such a pressure has fanned anti-American sentiment among a small but nevertheless increasingly vocal group in Korea society.

To know the nature of Koreans' understanding of the cause of Korea-U.S. trade friction, a study was conducted by using the editorials of Korean daily news papers as a measurement of local understanding of the trade issues. Specifically, Korean newspapers have traditionally enjoyed guardianship of information, justice and public interests and have been forming a role of public opinion. So, the editorials listed in newspaper is well expressing the feelings of Koreans on trade friction. In the newspapers, editorials dealing with trade are grouped by issue as seen in Table 2 [Ref. 101 p.328]

TABLE 2. Trade Issues (Chosun Ilbo)

Issues	No. of Editorials	Title of Editorial
Korean Trade policy	9	Trade War Korea's Trade Policy Surplus Management Mutual Understanding Sovereign Economic Surplus Trade
U.S. Pressure to open Korean market	8	Don't Hurry in opening Pressure and Opening Pressure from U.S. Mountain over Mountain Negotiations with U.S. Opening for Advanced Nations?
Specific Import Items	7	U.S. Cigarettes U.S. Movies Agricultural Products Intellectual Property Military Procurement Food Products
U.S. Protectionism	5	U.S. Protectionism Rising Protectionism
U.S. Discrimination	5	Discrimination Unfair Dumping Decision Korea, Scapegoat Shock from the U.S.
Won-Dollar Exchange Rate	5	Exchange Rate War Dollar Devaluation Won, Yen, Dollar
Trade Talks	2	IMF Korea-U.S. Aviation
Foreign Banks	1	Foreign Banks' Profit
Democratic Victory	1	U.S. Democratic Victory in November Election

As seen in the Table, editorials dealing with U.S. protectionism numbered 18, Korea trade policy 15, U.S. pressure to open the Korean market 14, specific import matters such as intellectual property right, cigarettes 11, Korea-U.S. trade talks 10, won revaluation 9, U.S. discrimination against Korea 5, etc. The newspaper editorials reflected Koreans' emotional outburst. Also, they disclosed their cool reactions. They suggested that the U.S. should restructure its industrial sector using more research and development investments and work to regain its competitive edge in the international market. At the same time, they informed their readers as well as the U.S. that Korea spends 25.3 percent of its budget on defense as shown in Table 3 and still carries a \$44.5 billion foreign debt as shown in Table 4. [Ref. 102:p.330]

TABLE 3. Korean Budget and Defense Expenditures

(Unit: 10 billion Won)

	1986	1987	Percentage of Difference(%)
GNP	82,816	92,571	11.8
Budget	17,028	19,418	13.2
Defense Expenditures	4,309	4,915	14.1
Defense in Budget(%)	25.3	25.3	

Source: Bank of Korea, Monthly Statistical Report, Jan, 1987

TABLE 4. Korea's Foreign Debt

(Unit: 10 billion Won)

Year	68	69	70	71	72	73
Foreign Debt	12.0	18.0	22.5	29.2	35.9	42.6

Year	74	75	76	77	78	79
Foreign Debt	59.4	84.6	105.3	126.5	148.7	205.0

Year	80	81	82	83	84	85
Foreign Debt	273.7	324.9	373.0	400.9	430.5	468.0

Year	86	87	88	89	90	91
Foreign Debt	445.0	418.0	390.0	365.0	345.0	329.0

1986-1991, expected debt.

Source: Department of Treasury,
 Financial Statistical Report, 1987

Korea has opened its market to 7000 items in the last years from foreign countries. Korea is angry at the U.S.'s continuous pressure to open the Korean market, and to gain retroactive intellectual property rights. "Why only Korea?" is the Korean complaint. The editorials claimed that no other nations was forced to take such measures retroactively. The Korean editorials wanted a gradual and slow institution of

intellectual property rights, and insurance, opening of the financial, agricultural and advertisement markets. They demonstrated their anger, criticizing the U.S.'s impatience and its lack of appreciation of Korean efforts to open its market. They used "the U.S. arrogance in trade negotiation." "U.S., misunderstanding." "continuous U.S. pressure." American style of negotiation was questioned. The aviation talks drew most emotive editorials--KAL access to Chicago was denied, but more U.S. airlines are now coming to Seoul. The Korean newspapers contended that Japan, not the United States, is the beneficiary from Korea's open-market policy, and the U.S. trade bills functioned as a pressure to Korea. But they changed their attitude from emotional response on the U.S's pressure to more controlled cognitive defense. [Ref. 103: p.514]

In the summer and fall of 1987, another questionnaire survey was conducted in Korea to identify the level of Korean's understanding of the cause of the Korea-U.S. trade frictions. Table 5 shows four group's response to the agreement on each issue.[Ref. 104: p.50]

TABLE 5. CONTINGENCY TABLE
Issues by Agreement to the Statement

ISSUES	Group of Respondents (%)*			
	College	Business	Bureau	Assembly
The U.S. trade deficit is the cause of trade friction	80	90	93	85
It is fair for U.S. media to deficit Korea as next Japan	11	78	77	83
The U.S. pressure on Korea to open its market wider is understandable	33	59	64	46
The U.S. wants Korea to open its market as much as the U.S. open its market to Korea	57	88	86	88
Opening the Korean market does not necessarily result in Korea's economic depression	42	62	82	68
Free and fair trade will eventually modernize the Korean economic system	38	84	89	89
Korea will continuously have its trade surplus with the U.S.	28	54	64	51

ISSUES	College	Business	Bureau	Assembly
The U.S. is not considering Korea's past trade deficit with the U.S.	63	84	91	95
The U.S. budget deficit makes the trade deficit worse	37	68	72	69
Koreans should pursue their own domestic market	45	26	9	23
Koreans should find its foreign market outside the U.S.	97	43	33	51
The U.S. dollar devaluation will reduce the U.S. trade deficit	37	80	85	89
The U.S. should lower their wage level to compete in international market	39	35	34	37
The U.S. needs managerial and technical innovations	83	93	98	98
The U.S. will eventually adopt a protectionist policy	72	46	51	60

* Figures represent row percentage of each group adding up "strongly agree" and "agree" in contingency table.

As shown in Table, students, businessmen, bureaucrats and legislators agree to 11 statements out of 20. However, students are different from three other groups. They are young, idealistic, and nationalistic. The traits of elitism, populism, resistance and negation of the establishment have been found among Korean students. Business and government managers show very similar attitude on the U.S.-Korea trade frictions.

Korea's remarkable export growth has been possible by exploring the relations between government and business. Korea's efficient export directors and business executives work in close cooperation for their export-oriented economy. The government directors manipulated the public policy tools which devised incentives that promote export. The national Assembly men and women are very close to business and government managers. Korea is homogeneous society, and that Korean politics make businessmen, bureaucrats and legislators interwoven.

Overall, understanding of Korean businessmen, bureaucrats and politicians on the Korea-U.S. trade friction is relatively sound. They do understand that the United States wants Korea to open its market as much as the U.S. open its market to Korea. Also, they forecast that free and fair trade will eventually modernize the Korean economic system in the long run. They are positive thinkers toward international trade.

But they want gradual opening and adjustment to free and fair international trade. Korea recently gained its trade surplus. It still has formidable foreign debts. With limited natural resources, the Korean government will continuously pursue foreign market-oriented economy. Eventually, Korea will adopt a free trade policy. Koreans hope that the U.S. government consider the time of adjustment to free trade, Korean domestic politics and Koreans' anti-U.S. sentiments for its trade policy.

VI. CONCLUSION

Throughout the mutual relationship between Korea and the U.S., Korea perceived America as "liberator" who eliminated the hated Japanese oppression lasted for 45 years(1910-1945), or as "savior" when the U.S. helped fight in the Korean war, or as "protector" who cared for Korean security.

The development of these relationship made the Korean people to regard the America as a special state which has a special concern and duty for Korea. This sort of perception stems from the traditional Confucian order which dominated the old Korean society.

Actually, in international relations, no other nations have maintained such a long and friendly relationship of trust and cooperation under the unilateral circumstances as that of Korea and the United States. Therefore it is natural for Korean to be oriented toward pro-American country in international society. Occasionally, the relationship between the U.S. and Korea has been recognized as "blood-hardened relationship" since the Korean war and the Vietnam war. Before the 1980s, Koreans perception of America was unilaterally positive, and America was the symbol of greatness.

But in recent years, that kind of perception is changing gradually. Of course most of the Korean people are still

friendly to Americans but they do not hesitate to criticize the United States. It is obvious that the pro-American sentiment of the past has faded. This prompted one observer to comment that the "special relationship" born in the foxholes during the Korean war and Vietnam war had been turned into "a marriage of inconvenience". Furthermore the inconvenience was developed toward anti-sentiment in recent years.

What's the reason? Traditionally, the special relationship formed throughout mutual relations made the Korean people to rely on and expect from America what they need. There are still some Koreans who believe and expect that America should take a more active role in support of current Koreans' desire. To the extent that America fails in meeting their expectations, they are disappointed and disillusioned. From the past, Korean's ardent desire was for Korea reunification, sound democratization, and national development. In the Koreans point of view, the U.S. is associated with these matters at least indirectly. But still, their ardent desire was not filled. Now, Koreans begin to question the historical and fundamental causes of these matters.

Koreans feel that the division of Korea is partly responsible for America because it was originated from U.S. suggestion at the end of the World War II, even though it was not the original intention of America. At this point, it is

worth reminding the comment of Professor Robert T. Oliver. He said that "The security of South Korea is a moral obligation for the United States because it was our President Franklin D. Roosevelt who, in early 1945, decided to invite Russia into the Korean peninsula... Furthermore, it was upon Roosevelt's insistence that the projected restoration of Korean independence to follow Japan's defeat was postponed and subjected to an awkward and unworkable plan to place Korea under a four-power trusteeship... What eventuated was the 38th parallel division of Korea, which led to the Korean war and which poses continuing danger to the peace of the world."

[Ref. 105: p.22]

On the other hand, democratization in Korea is one of their desires cherished from long times ago. The anti-government movement in the 1980s has shifted its emphasis from a struggle against dictatorship to a struggle against the United States. The movement's leaders, in the course of struggling for democracy, have grown to believe that the U.S. has been the support behind the scenes for the military dictatorship and that without removal of American influence in Korea, democratization of South Korea is difficult. In the anti-government demonstrations, students have always called for the withdrawal of U.S. forces and American nuclear weapons from South Korea, along with the overthrow of the military dictatorship. The anti-American movement has moved

side by side with the democratization struggle in the nation.

Furthermore, anti-Americanism grows worse and more extensive since the recent trade pressure from America. Many Koreans strongly protest their government's moves to end protectionism and yield to American pressure. The people feel that South Korea is trying to build up an economy that seems to be very competitive in world markets, with its poor natural resources and a heavy defense burden and trade deficit.

For the foreseeable future, there is bound to be friction in the Korean-American relationship based on trade competition, rising nationalism in South Korea, America's relative loss of military and economic power and subsequent weakening of its political influence, and Korean resentment over past dependency. The rise of anti-Americanism is causing Koreans to regard the United States as simply another foreign nation, accordingly, to harbor no special expectations from it and to feel no bitter disillusionment about it. Rational criticism of the United States is not fundamentally harmful to either country, but both need to review and readjust the existing relationship. Perhaps the current anti-Americanism is an expression of labor pains as an entirely new and more mature relationship based on an equal partnership is built between the South Korea and the United States.

What is perhaps wrong with the Korean attitude is that Koreans often forget the fundamental truth that any

individual, organization, or nation even such as America, exists to help others as long as such help coincides with self-interest. Because of this, Koreans often fall victim to overblown expectations and painful disappointments especially in the relations with United States.

To Korea, America is not just an ally but is recognized as an essential ally. The reverse, however, is not always true in international society. To America, Korea is merely one of their friendly nations, strictly speaking. Accordingly, Koreans tend to approach the matter of Korea as a bilateral Korean-American issue, whereas Americans view the question from the broader perspective of global strategy.

In conclusion, as for the improvement of the relationship between the United States and South Korea, it is necessary for the two countries to recognize that each have unique and different historic experiences, diverse aspirations and values, as well as current internal and external problems. Each should have better knowledge and understanding of the partner's mentality and way of life. One can not be too wrong to say that both the Korea and the United States have superficial knowledge of each other at best, and a minimum amount of understanding of the partner. Both should make efforts to minimize the differences of perception and interests, and to understand the background of anti-feeling while reducing misunderstanding of the partner's intentions

through government endeavour and more civilian level contact.

Lastly, I can say that Korean's perception of America may be one-sided or prejudiced. So, I think, it will be worth researching for American student to talk American's perception of Korea for balanced understanding.

APPENDIX A

The full text of the Taft-Katsura Memorandum

Count Katsura and Secretary Taft had a long and confidential conversation on the morning of July 27th. Among other topics of conversation, the following views were exchanged regarding the question of the Philippine Islands, of Corea, and of the maintenance of general peace in the East:

First, In speaking of some pro-Russians in America who would have the public believe that the victory of Japan would be a certain prelude to her aggression in the direction of the Philippine Island, Secretary Taft observed that Japan's only interests in the Philippine would be in his opinion to have these Islands governed by a strong and friendly nation like the United States, and not to have them placed either under the misrule of the natives yet unfit for self government or in the hands of some unfriendly European power. Count Katsura confirmed in strongest terms the correctness of his views on the point and positively stated that Japan does not harbour any aggressive design whatever on the Philippines, adding that all the insinuations of the "Yellow Peril" type are nothing more or less than malicious and clumsy slanders calculated to do mischief to Japan.

Second, Count Katsura observed that the maintenance of

general peace in the extreme East forms the fundamental principle of Japan's international policy. Such being the case, he was very anxious to exchange views with Secretary Taft as to the most effective means for insuring this principle. In his opinion, the best and, in fact, the only means for accomplishing the above objective would be to form good understanding between the three governments of Japan, the United States and Great Britain, which have common interest in upholding the principle of "Open Door." The Count well understands the traditional policy of the United States in this respect and perceives fully the impossibility of their entering into a formal alliance of such nature with any foreign nation. But in view of our common interests, he cannot see why some good understanding or an alliance, in practice, if not in name, should not be made between those three nations in so far as respects the affairs in the East. With such understanding firmly formed, general peace in these regions would be easily maintained to the great benefit of all powers concerned.

Secretary Taft said that it was difficult, indeed impossible, for the President of the United States to enter even into any understanding amounting in effect to a confidential informal agreement without the consent of the Senate, but that he felt sure that without any agreement at all the people of the United States were so fully in accord

with a policy of Japan and Great Britain in the maintenance of peace in the Far East that whatever occasion arose appropriate action of the Government of the United States in conjunction with Japan and The Great Britain for such a purpose could be counted on by them quite as confidently as if the United States were under treaty obligations to take it.

Third, In regard to the Corean question, Count Katsura observed that Corea being the direct cause of our war with Russia it is a matter of absolute importance to Japan that a complete solution of the peninsula question should be made as the logical consequence of the war. If left to herself after the war, Corea will certainly drift back to her former habit of improvidently entering into any agreements or treaties with other powers, thus resuscitating the same international complications as existed before the war. In view of the foregoing circumstances, Japan feels absolutely constrained to take some definite step with a view to precluding the possibility of Corea falling back into her former condition and of placing us again under the necessity of entering upon another foreign war.

Secretary Taft fully admitted the justness of the Count's observations and remarked to the effect that in his personal opinion the establishment of a suzerainty over Korea enter into no foreign treaties without the consent of Japan was the logical result of the present war and would directly

contribute to permanent peace in the Far East. His judgement was that President Roosevelt would concur in his views in this regard, although he had no authority to give assurance of this. Indeed Secretary Taft added that he felt much delicacy in advancing the views he did, for he had no mandate for the purpose from the President, and since he left Washington Mr. Root had been appointed Secretary of State, and he might seem thus to be trespassing on another's Department. He could not, however, in view of Count Katsura's courteous desire to discuss the questions, decline to express his opinions which he had formed while he was temporarily discharging the duties of Secretary of State under the direction of the President; and he would forward to Mr. Root and the President a memorandum of the conversation. Count Katsura said that he would transmit the same confidentially to Baron Komura.

End of quotation.

Prime Minister quite anxious for interview. If I have spoken too freely or inaccurately or unwisely I know you can and will correct it. Do not want to butt in but under circumstances difficult to avoid statement and so told truth as I believe it. Count Katsura especially requested that our conversation be confined to you and the President so have not advised Griscom. If necessary under your direction Foreign Office can give him a copy.

APPENDIX B

Cairo Agreement (U.S.A, U.K, CHINA) Dec 1, 1943

The several military missions have agreed upon future military operations against Japan. The Three Great Allies expressed their resolve to bring unrelenting pressure against their brutal enemies by sea, land, and air. This pressure is already rising.

The Three Great Allies are fighting this war to restrain and punish the aggression of Japan. They covet no gain for themselves and have no thought of territorial expansion. It is their purpose that Japan shall be stripped of all the islands in the Pacific which she has seized or occupied since the beginning of the first World War in 1914 and that all the territories Japan has stolen from the Chinese, such as Manchuria, Formosa, and the Pescadores, shall be restored to the Republic of China. Japan will also be expelled from all other territories which she has taken by violence and greed. The aforesaid three great powers, mindful of the enslavement of the people of Korea, are determined that in due course Korea shall become free and independent.

With these objects in view, the three Allies, in harmony with those of the United Nations at war with Japan, will continue to persevere in the serious and prolonged operations

necessary to procure the unconditional surrender of Japan.

Signed: Franklin D. Roosevelt, Winston Churchill, Chiang Kai-Shek

From : Dept. of State Bulletin, Vol. IX, p. 393

APPENDIX C

Extract From Moscow Agreement (U.S.A., U.K., U.S.S.R.)

December 27, 1945

1. With a view to the reestablishment of Korea as an independent state, the creation of conditions for developing the country on democratic principles and the earliest possible liquidation of the disastrous results of the protracted Japanese domination in Korea, there shall be set up a provisional Korean democratic government which shall take all the necessary steps for developing the industry, transport and agriculture of Korea and the national culture of the Korean peopled
2. In order to assist the formation of a provisional Korean government and with a view to the preliminary elaboration of the appropriate measures, there shall be established a Joint Commission consisting of representatives of the United States Command in southern Korea and the Soviet command in northern Korea. In preparing their proposals the Commission shall consult with the Korean democratic parties and social organizations. The recommendations worked out by the Commission shall be presented for the consideration of the Governments of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, China and the United Kingdom and the United States prior to final

decision by the two Governments represented
on the Joint Commission.

3. It shall be the task of the Joint Commission, with the participation of the provisional Korean democratic government and of the Korean democratic organizations to work out measures also for helping and assisting (trusteeship) the political, economic and social progress of the Korean people, the development of democratic self-government and the establishment of the national independence of Korea.

The proposals of the Joint Commission shall be submitted, following consultation with the provisional Korean Government for the joint consideration of the Governments of the United States, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom and China for the working out of an agreement concerning a four-power trusteeship of Korea for a period of up to five years.

Signed: V. Molotov

Ernest Bevin

James F. Byrnes

From: Korea's Independence, Bulletin of the Department of State,
(No. 2933), October 1947, pp. 18-19

APPENDIX D
THE TRUMAN DOCTRINE

The gravity of the situation which confronts the world today necessitates my appearance before a joint session of the Congress. The foreign policy and the national security of this country are involved.

One aspect of the present situation, which I wish to present to you at this time for your consideration and decision, concerns Greece and Turkey.

The United States has received from the Greek Government an urgent appeal for financial and economic assistance. Preliminary reports from the American Economic Mission now in Greece and reports from the American Ambassador in Greece corroborate the statement of the Greek Government that assistance is imperative if Greece is to survive as a free nation.

The very existence of the Greek state is today threatened by the terrorist activities of several thousand armed men, led by Communists, who defy the Government's authority at a number of points, particularly along the northern boundaries,...

Meanwhile, the Greek Government is unable to cope with the situation. The Greek Army is small and poorly equipped. It needs supplies and equipment if it is to restore the

authority of the Government throughout Greek territory.

Greece must have assistance if it is to become a self supporting and self respecting democracy. The United States must supply that assistance. We have already extended to Greece certain types of relief and economic aid but these are inadequate. There is no other country to which democratic Greece can turn. No other nation is willing and able to provide the necessary support for a democratic Greek Government.

The British Government, which has been helping Greece, can give no further financial or economic aid after March 31. Great Britain finds itself under the necessity of reducing or liquidating its commitments in several parts of the world, including Greece.

One of the primary objectives of the foreign policy of the United States is the creation of conditions in which we and other nations will be able to work out a way of life free from coercion. This was a fundamental issue in the war with Germany and Japan. Our victory was won over countries which sought to impose their will, and their way of life, upon other nations.

To insure the peaceful development of nations, free from coercion, the United States has taken a leading part in establishing the United Nations. The United Nations is designed to make possible lasting freedom and independence for

all its members. We shall not realize our objectives, however, unless we are willing to help free people to maintain their free institutions and their national integrity against aggressive movements that seek to impose upon them totalitarian regimes. This is no more than a frank recognition that totalitarian regimes imposed on free peoples, by direct or indirect aggression, undermine the foundations of international peace and hence the security of the United

The peoples of a number of countries of the world have recently had totalitarian regimes forced upon them against their will. The Government of the United States has made frequent protests against coercion and intimidation, in violation of the Yalta Agreement, in Poland, Rumania, and Bulgaria. I must also state that in a number of other countries there have been similar developments.

At the present moment in world history nearly every nation must choose between alternative ways of life. The choice is too often not a free one.

One way of life is based upon the will of the majority, and is distinguished by free institutions, representative government, free elections, guarantees of individual liberty, freedom of speech and religion, and freedom from political oppression.

A second way of life is based upon the will of a minority forcibly imposed upon the majority. It relies upon terror and

oppression, a controlled press and radio, fixed elections, and the suppression of personal freedoms.

I believe that it must be the policy of the United States to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures.

I believe that we must assist free people to work out their own destinies in their own way.

I believe that our help should be primarily through economic and financial aid which is essential to economic stability and orderly political processes.

The world is not static, and the status quo is not sacred. But we cannot allow changes in the status quo in violation of the Charter of the United Nations by such methods as coercion, or by such subterfuges as political infiltration. In helping free and independent nations to maintain their freedom, the United States will be giving effect to the principles of the Charter of the United Nations.

It is necessary only to glance at a map to realize that the survival and integrity of the Greek nation are of grave importance in a much wider situation. If Greece should fall under the control of an armed minority, the effect upon its neighbor, Turkey, would be immediate and serious. Confusion and disorder might well spread throughout the entire Middle East.

Moreover, the disappearance of Greece as an independent

state would have a profound effect upon those countries in Europe whose peoples are struggling against great difficulties to maintain their freedoms and their independence while they repair the damages of war.

It would be an unspeakable tragedy if these countries, which have struggled so long against overwhelming odds, should lose the victory for which they sacrificed so much. Collapse of free institutions and loss of independence would be disastrous not only for them but for the world. Discouragement and possible failure would quickly be the lot of neighboring peoples striving to maintain their freedom and independence.

Should we fail to aid Greece and Turkey in this fateful hour, the effect will be far reaching to the West as well as to the East. We must take immediate and resolute action.

APPENDIX E

Extract From Acheson's Speech

about Military Security in the Pacific

Now, let's in the light of that consider some of these policies. First of all, let's deal with the question of military security. I deal with it first because it is important and because, having stated our policy in that regard, we must clearly understand that the military menace is not the most immediate.

What is the situation in regard to the military security of the Pacific area, and what is our policy in regard to it? In the first place, the defeat and the disarmament of Japan has placed upon the United States the necessity of assuming the military defense of Japan so long as that is required, both in the interest of our security and in the interests of the security of the entire Pacific area and, in all honor, in the interest of Japanese security. We have American - and there are Australian - troops in Japan. I am not in a position to speak for the Australians, but I can assure you that there is no intention of any sort of abandoning or weakening the defenses of Japan and that what-ever arrangements are to be made either through permanent settlement or otherwise, that defense must and shall be maintained

This defensive perimeter runs along the Aleutians to Japan and then goes to the Ryukyus. We hold important defense positions in the Ryukyu Islands, and those we will continue to hold. In the interest of the population of the Ryukyu Islands, we will at an appropriate time offer to hold these islands under trusteeship of the United Nations. But they are essential parts of the defensive perimeter of the Pacific, and they must and will be held.

The defensive perimeter runs from the Ryukyus to the Philippine Islands. Our relations, our defensive relations with the Philippines are contained in agreements between us. Those agreements are being loyally carried out and will be loyally carried out. Both peoples have learned by bitter experience the vital connections between our mutual defense requirements. We are in no doubt about that, and it is hardly necessary for me to say an attack on the Philippines could not and would not be tolerated by the United States. But I hasten to add that no one perceives the imminence of any such attack.

So far as the military security of other areas in the Pacific is concerned, it must be clear that no person can guarantee these areas against military attack. But it must also be clear that such a guarantee is hardly sensible or necessary within the realm of practical relationship. Should such an attack occur - one hesitates to say where such

an armed attack could come from - the initial reliance must be on the people attacked to resist it and then upon the commitments of the entire civilized world under the Charter of the United Nations which so far has not proved a weak reed to lean on by any people who are determined to protect their independence against outside aggression. But it is a mistake, I think, in considering Pacific and Far Eastern problems to become obsessed with military considerations. Important as they are, there are other problems that press, and these other problems are not capable of solution through military means. These other problems arise out of the susceptibility of many areas, and many countries in the Pacific area, to subversion and penetration. That cannot be stopped by military means.

Secretary of State Acheson's Speech to the National Press Club on January 12, 1950.

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